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STATUTES 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
-11-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(j) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellees will rely upon the table of contents provided by Appellant in its appellate 
brief and address the three topics delineated in "bold" type and designated as subsections 
"A," "B," and "C" under the "Statement of Issue and Standards of Review" section of 
Appellant's brief. Appellees assume that three subsections designated "A," "B," and "C" 
are those central issues on appeal. The three subsections are: "Sykes Allowed to Slander 
Hatch and make Himself a Hero," "Inappropriate Jury Instruction #19," and "Wrongful 
Summary Judgment Granted Christiansen." [See Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-5]. 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Appellee Dwane J. 
Sykes to make certain statements as a pro se Defendant in the action. 
Standard of Review: Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
The determination by a trial court to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403 of 
the Utah Rules of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and will not 
be overturned unless it is "beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. 633 East 640 
North, 942 P.2d 925, 930 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 
(Utah 1992)). 
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2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Jury Instruction #19 to 
be submitted to the jury. 
Standard of Review: "[T]he propriety of a jury instruction presents a question of 
law" which is reviewed for "correctness." State v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90, 99 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998) (citations omitted). 
3. The trial court did not err in granting William Christiansen's motion to 
dismiss. Even if error was committed, William Christiansen's dismissal was 
appropriate and did not affect the outcome of the case. 
Standard of Review: The propriety of a dismissal based on Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) is a question of law and reviewed under a correctness standard. See 
Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 987 P.2d 602, 602 (Utah 1999). Furthermore, 
"Jurisdictional questions are ... reviewed for correctness." State v. Finlay son, 2004 
UT10,l[5,84P.3dll93. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February, 22, 2000, the trial court issued Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment in Civ. # 950400719. The case was tried before a jury in an eight day trial 
from October 18 through October 22, 1999 and from October 25 through October 27, 
1999. In response to the Special Verdict Form, the jury found in favor of 
Appellee/Defendant Dwane Sykes (hereinafter, "Appellee Sykes") exonerating him of all 
charges of fraudulent transfer, and improper influence. [See Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum "1"]. Appellant Hatch 
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seeks review of five issues: 
1. "The lax way in which the judge conducted the trial, allowing a tremendous 
amount of irrelevant and immaterial testimony to come before the jury." 
2. "Allowing a jury instruction [#19] to be included entitled 'Equity/ which 
suggested that Hatch had come before the jury with 'unclean hands.'" 
3. The trial court granting of Defendant William Christiansen's Motion to 
Dismiss before he was served. 
4. The award of attorney's fees to Defendant William Christiansen on his Motion 
to Dismiss. 
5. Rule 11 Sanctions granted against Appellant Hatch on motion by Defendant 
William Christiansen. [See Appellant's Brief, pp. 40-41]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The litigation underlying the present appeal is long and tortuous and involves 
multiple lawsuits. For brevity's sake, Appellees will reiterate only the main historical 
facts relevant to this appeal: 
1. Appellant Hatch and Appellee Sykes entered into an option agreement in June 
1974 whereby Appellant Hatch would sell his home and property located at 
1511 South Carterville Road in Orem, Utah. 
2. After Appellee Sykes obtained title to the aforementioned property, a legal 
dispute arose between the two men. 
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3. Several lawsuits were filed in the Fourth District Court of Utah County (Civ.# 
57,125, Civ. # 57,127 and Civ. # 63,695), which suits were later consolidated 
into one suit (Civ. # 8120457127). 
4. On February 6, 1995, Appellant Hatch obtained a judgment against Appellee 
Sykes for $509,942.03, which amount was reduced by the court to $141,693.52 
on a motion for reconsideration. 
5. On appeal, this Court remanded the case to the trial court, resulting in a final 
judgment of $260,000.00. 
6. A further aspect of this earlier litigation is important as it relates to William 
Christiansen. 
7. William Christiansen was named a defendant in the earlier suits that were later 
consolidated into Civ. # 8120457127. 
8. Even before consolidation of the three suits had occurred, trial court Judge 
Mower had dismissed William Christiansen as a party. [See April 17, 1991 
Order, attached hereto as Addendum "2"]. 
9. In fact, Judge Mower granted William Christiansen attorney's fees in that same 
April 17, 1991 Order because the plaintiffs (including Appellant Hatch) failed 
to notify the parties and the court of the filing and dismissal of their 
bankruptcy. 
10. After the three older lawsuits were consolidated into one suit (Civ. # 
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8120457127), Judge Mower was again compelled to issue an Order against 
Appellant Hatch because Mr. Hatch had attempted to sell William 
Christiansen's property by sheriffs sale even though the court had previously 
dismissed William Christiansen from the underlying litigation. [See July 5, 
1995 Order, attached hereto as Addendum "3"]. 
11. In the July 5, 1995 Order, Judge Mower explained that the sheriffs sale was 
"not supported by the requisite order" from any court of "competent 
jurisdiction" and that any claim against William Christiansen was "barred by 
the doctrine of 'res judicata."' [See July 5, 1995 Order, pp. 1-2]. 
12. The trial court, again, granted William Christiansen attorney's fees because 
Appellant Hatch had made a "frivolous" attempt to attach Mr. Christiansen's 
property. [See July 5, 1995 Order, pp. 1-2]. 
13.Unfortunately, the problems involving William Christiansen, were not laid to 
rest. 
14. On November 30, 1995, Appellant Hatch filed a subsequent suit (Civ.# 
950400719, which forms the basis of this appeal) to enforce the $260,000.00 
judgment he had obtained against Appellee Sykes in the earlier consolidated 
suit. 
15. The November 30, 1995 Complaint charged Appellee Sykes with the fraudulent 
transfer of certain assets and real property in order to avoid paying the earlier 
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judgment obtained by Appellant Hatch. Appellant also charged Appellee Sykes 
with exercising improper influence over trusts, trustees, and trust assets. [See 
Complaint, attached hereto as Addendum "4"]. 
16. When Appellant first filed his Complaint in the aforementioned suit on 
November 30, 1995, William Christiansen was not named a defendant in the 
action. 
17. Presumably, Appellant Hatch did not name William Christiansen in the 
November 30, 1995 because he knew better than to involve Mr. Christiansen 
after the trial court, in previous litigation involving the same transactions, had 
upheld Mr. Christiansen's dismissal and had penalized Appellant Hatch for 
trying to attach Mr. Christiansen's property after the dismissal. 
18. Surprisingly, when Appellant Hatch filed an Amended Complaint on August 27, 
1996, Mr. Christiansen was, once again, named as a defendant. [See Amended 
Complaint, attached hereto as Addendum "5"]. 
19. William Christiansen's attorney filed a Motion to Dismiss and supporting 
memorandum. [See Motion to Dismiss Claims Against William Christiansen 
and Memorandum in Support, attached hereto as Addendum "6"]. 
20. In the Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Christiansen, through counsel, again asserts res 
judicata and statute of limitations as bases for dismissal. 
21. Mr. Christiansen also requested attorney's fees and sanctions to be assessed 
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against Appellant Hatch in the Motion to Dismiss. 
22. In response, Appellant Hatch answered that Mr. Christiansen had not yet been 
served, and therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear Mr. 
Christiansen's Motion to Dismiss. [See Plaintiffs Response Reply to 
Christiansen Motion to Dismiss Claim and Counterclaim; and Plaintiffs 
Motion for Dismissal and/or Removal Christiansen as a Named Party 
Defendant, pp. 1,5, attached hereto as Addendum "7"]. 
23. It is highly significant that Appellant Hatch's motion also includes a "Motion 
for Dismissal and/or Removal [sic] Christiansen as a Named Party Defendant." 
24. In Appellant Hatch's response, he notes that "Plaintiff [Appellant Hatch] has no 
problem with the idea that Christiansen should not be served in this matter and 
that if necessary, his name may be removed from the heading of the amended 
complaint." [See Plaintiffs Response Reply, p. 4]. 
25. In his response, Appellant Hatch also "moves this court for an order removing 
the name of William Christiansen from the heading of the case, and if necessary 
because of the voluntary answer filed by Christiansen, that the matter be 
dismissed as to him." [See Plaintiffs Response Reply, p. 5]. 
26. Trial court Judge Eyre ultimately ordered that all claims against William 
Christiansen be dismissed and awarded attorney's fees to Mr. Christiansen. 
The trial court also reserved the right to award Rule 11 sanctions until the time 
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that Mr. Christiansen's counterclaim was heard. [See Order for Dismissal of 
Claims Against William Christiansen, attached hereto as Addendum "8"]. 
27. After a jury trial on October 20-21, 1999, the jury awarded Mr. Christiansen 
$1,000.00 in compensatory damages for Appellant Hatch's abuse of civil 
process. [See August 7, 1999 Judgment and Order, attached hereto as 
Addendum "9"]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Appellee Sykes to make 
certain statements and introduce two documents during the course of litigation. On the 
contrary, the trial court exercised proper and direct control over the proceedings and 
instructed the jury appropriately as to the law and the testimony offered during trial. 
Appellee Sykes represented himself in the matter. The trial court set clear parameters for 
Sykes. Appellant's attorney failed to object to many of Appellee Sykes' statements. 
Furthermore, any statements by Sykes that were admitted over Appellant's objections 
were harmless and did not prejudice the jury. 
Jury instruction #19 was appropriate given the charges made by Appellant against 
Appellee Sykes. The trial court deemed the case to involve issues of equity and therefore 
allowed jury instruction #19 to be included. Even if jury instruction #19 was not entirely 
appropo to the case, the balance of the jury instructions and the reception of evidence and 
management of the trial by the trial court as well as closing arguments evidence that the 
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parties received a fair trial and that the jury was not prejudiced by the sole "offending" 
instruction. 
By filing his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant William Christiansen acceded to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court even though he was not served with the Amended Complaint. 
Even if this Court determines that the trial court erred procedurally in granting the 
Motion to Dismiss, Appellant subsequently, and of his own accord, motioned the trial 
court to dismiss William Christiansen after receiving the Mr. Christiansen's Motion to 
Dismiss. Defendant William Christiansen was dismissed and all parties agreed to the 
dismissal. The only questions remaining, if any, are whether the trial court should have 
granted attorney's fees to Mr. Christiansen on his Motion to Dismiss and whether 
subsequent sanctions were appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Appellee Sykes to make 
certain statements as a pro se Defendant in the action. 
The determination by a trial court to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403 of 
the Utah Rules of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and will not 
be overturned unless it is "beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. 633 East 640 
North, 942 P.2d 925, 930 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 
(Utah 1992)). 
"A trial court's rulings with regard to the admissibility of evidence are generally 
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accorded substantial deference: c[t]rial courts have wide latitude in making determinations 
of relevance, probativeness, and prejudice.'" Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 63 
P.3d 686 (Utah 2002) (quoting State v. 633 East 640 North, 942 P.2d 925, 929 (Utah 
1997)). 
Appellant's first issue on appeal concerns statements made by Appellee Dwane 
Sykes (who appeared pro se) during the course of trial. In his appellate brief, Appellant 
relies primarily upon emotion-laden and generalized terms in arguing that the trial court 
abused its discretion in allowing Appellee Sykes to make certain statements during trial. 
Appellant argues that, among other things, Appellee Dwane Sykes was allowed to: 
"slander [Mr.] Hatch and make himself a hero," "make manifold irrelevant statements of 
fact which was a great waste of the court's time and created confusion for the jury," 
"make numerous comments of a derogatory nature about [Mr. Hatch]," "go on endlessly 
bragging about himself to bias the jury in his favor," "make prejudicial, inflammatory, or 
slanderous statements," and to "make wild, untrue gratuitous accusations." [See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-12]. 
This sort of vague generalizing, however, does not prove that the trial court abused 
its discretion. Appellant does provide a few specific examples of statements made by 
Appellee Sykes during the trial that he deems prejudicial. Many of those statements, as 
Appellant acknowledges, were made during Appellee Sykes opening statement. [See 
Appellant's Brief, p. 10]. 
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While it is true that Appellant's counsel interposed several objections during 
Appellee Sykes' opening statement, a review of Sykes' opening remarks and their 
corresponding objections (as specifically cited by Appellant in its brief at p. 10) proves 
that the trial court handled the objections appropriately, and that no prejudice resulted: 
1. MR. SYKES: "To show that it [sic] intended fraud, he [Mr. Hatch] has to 
show according to—he has to show that I made the conveyance without 
receiving reasonable equivalent value, and that at the time I became insolvent as 
a result of the transfers." MR. AMOTT: "I will place an objection on the 
record. This is a misstatement of the law. It is incomplete, and inaccurate, and 
confusing to the jury." THE COURT: "Le me advise the jury. I am going to 
be advising you as to what the law is. I will be instructing you as to what the 
law is, and I think what this attorney says isn't law. What Mr. Sykes says as his 
own attorney is not evidence either. I think he will be swom. He will be asked 
questions and he will be testifying. At that time you can consider it as evidence 
. . .So, again, to the extent you hear any statements of what the law is, it is 
inconsistent with what I instruct you. My instructions will be the law and you 
are to follow my instructions, okay?" [See October 18, 1999 Transcript of 
Proceedings, 6:11 through 7:8 (bate stamped 2469)]. 1 
2. MR. AMOTT: "Do we have testimony here, or are we giving an opening 
statement?" THE COURT: "Tell me, is this going to be evidence that your are 
going to present?" MR SYKES: "This is what the evidence will show." THE 
COURT: "All right. Go ahead." MR. SYKES: "The reasons for the lawsuit, 
the evidence will show, is. . . ." [See October 18, 1999 Transcript of 
Proceedings, 13:15-22 (bate stamped 2469)]. 
3. MR. AMOTT: "If he is going to testify again now—and also again, I am just 
worrying about our time frame." THE COURT: "This should just be a very 
brief outline of what you're going to present. If they are going to hear it in 
evidence, you can argue at the close of trial." MR. SYKES: So we determined 
1 The bate stamp number is provided because several of the transcripts are from 
proceedings that occurred on the same day. Page number and line number (where 
necessary for reference) shall be separated by a colon (i.e. 6:11 through 7:8 indicates that 
the information is taken from page 6 at line 11 and continuing through page 7 at line 8). 
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that the thing to do would be to donate the house into the trust, also." [See 
October 18, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 14:16-22 (bate stamped 2469)]. 
4. MR. AMOTT: "I am going to object, your Honor. There has been again—he 
is not only testifying not under oath, he is testifying about irrelevant things that 
are not going to be in the trial." THE COURT: "How does this relate to the 
matter that is before this Court and this jury." (Thereafter, the trial court, Mr. 
Amott and Mr. Sykes discuss the relevance of the issue of title to a certain 
parcel of property). THE COURT: "Yes. Just try to outline what you think the 
evidence will show. Don't go into all of the details of all of the evidence now, 
or we won't ever get through. But do tell us that he had a piece of property and 
just what you think the evidence will show, just briefly." [See October 18, 
1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 16:11 through 18:16 (bate stamped 2469)]. 
Although a recitation of the foregoing testimony is laborious, such an exercise 
clearly shows that the trial court acted appropriately in instructing the jury when 
Appellant's counsel objected to certain statements made by Appellee Sykes. Moreover, 
the trial court properly restricted Sykes when he began speaking too freely about irrelevant 
subject matter during his opening arguments. Because Appellee Sykes represented 
himself pro se, it is understandable that some objections would be made and that the trial 
court would have to provide some guidance during trial. The record proves that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when handling certain objections made by Appellant. 
On the contrary, the trial court instructed both the jury and Appellee Sykes as to the 
requirements of the law, and advised Sykes to avoid belaboring irrelevant points. 
Appellant also takes issue with certain statements made by Appellee Sykes about 
his own health, and with negative statements made by Appellee Sykes against Appellant. 
[See Appellant's Brief, p. 10]. Appellant does not inform this Court, however, that none 
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of these particular statements were objected to. Nor does Appellant clarify the fact that 
these statements were made during opening arguments. 
Appellant lists another set of "inflammable and false statements" made by Appellee 
Sykes during Sykes' direct examination by Mr. Amott. [See Appellant's Brief, p. 10-11]. 
However, a review of the trial transcript shows that Mr. Amott did not object to any of 
these alleged "inflammable and false statements" at the time they were made. 
In Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc^ 68 P.3d 1015, 1019 (Utah App. 2003), 
this Court advised: 
"Utah courts require specific objections in order 'to bring all claimed errors to 
the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if 
appropriate.'" State v. Brown, 856P.2d358, 361 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (quoting 
VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Mack Distrib., Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988)). "This specificity requirement arises out of the trial court's need 
to assess allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in the 
context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue." Id. "The 'mere mention' 
of an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority 
does not preserve that issue for appeal." Id (quoting LeBaron & Assoc, v. 
Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct.App. 1991)). "[F]or an issue to be 
sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of 
consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it." Id. (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
Because Mr. Amott did not object to the allegedly offensive statements, Appellant 
cannot now assert that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the statements to 
stand at trial. Appellant did not preserve its right to have this Court review the statements 
in question, and did not allow the trial court to rule on the relevancy of the statements in 
the first instance. It is worth noting that Appellant acknowledges that "Hatch's attorney 
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failed on many occasions to [object] out of fear of offending the trial court and in the 
interests of time." [See Appellant's Brief, p. 9]. 
Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 
"Orem City" letter and "Explorers Club of New York City" article to be included as 
exhibits at trial. [See Appellant's Brief, p. 12 and 14]. 
During testimony, Appellee Sykes referred to a letter dated February 11, 1981 from 
Orem City to Appellanl Hatch in relation to the "Ragozzine" property. Appellant's 
attorney, Mr. Amott, objected to inclusion of the letter and any testimony related thereto 
as "irrelevant." [See October 25, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 5:18 through 6:24 (bate 
stamped 2473)]. The trial court then explained to Sykes that his testimony must be 
focused on "relevant information, evidence, testimony" concerning the trusts at issue in 
the litigation. [See October 25, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 7:7-15 (bate stamped 
2473)]. 
Thereafter, the trial court allowed both Mr. Ludlow (who represented the Sykes 
Trust) and Mr. Amott to voir dire Appellee Sykes. During the course of the voir dire, 
Sykes explained why the parcel in issue was included in a particular trust. At the 
conclusion of the voir dire, the trial court ruled that the Orem City letter was relevant to 
the charges raised in the case (i.e. fraudulent conveyance) and allowed the letter to be 
included. [See October 25, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 8:2 through 13:10 (bate 
stamped 2473)]. Because the Orem City letter served as a partial explanation for why 
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Sykes transferred the "Ragozzine" property into the trust, the letter was relevant to Sykes5 
defense as to the charge of fraudulent conveyance. The trial court ruled correctly in 
admitting the letter. 
As to the "Explorers Club of New York City" article, Mr. Amott objected to its 
inclusion on the basis of relevance. The trial court ruled that although page 1 of the 
article was hearsay, page 2 was relevant as to the establishment of an insurance policy by 
Appellee Sykes, and as an explanation for why Sykes set up trusts. [See October 25, 1999 
Transcript of Proceedings, 40:19 through 44:8 (bate stamped 2473)]. Again, these facts 
were relevant to Appellee Sykes' defense as to why he established certain trusts. 
Most importantly, Appellant offers no cognizable argument on appeal against the 
inclusion of either the Orem City letter or the "Explorers Club of New York City" article 
as evidence during trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these to 
documents to be introduced for evidentiary purposes. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in 
permitting certain statements to be made during trial, or that the letter and article should 
not have been introduced on evidentiary grounds, Appellant must still establish that the 
error affected the outcome of the case. "If the error was harmless, that is, if the error was 
sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the 
outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order." Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 
1255 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997)). 
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Appellant cannot prove that any alleged errors affected the outcome of the case. 
Therefore, Appellant's qualms over "fairness" of the trial remain unproven. 
2. The trial court did not err in allowing Jury Instruction #19 to be submitted to 
the jury. 
"A trial court's ruling concerning a jury instruction is reviewed for correctness. A 
new trial will not be granted unless any error of the trial court was prejudicial, meaning 
that it misadvised or misled the jury on the law." Butler v. Naylor, 987 P.2d 41, 43 (Utah 
1999) (citations omitted). 
In Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1991), this Court considered 
whether a jury instruction on the tax consequences of a damage award was sufficiently 
prejudicial so as to affect the outcome of the damage award. This Court specifically 
considered the context in which the objectionable jury instruction was presented by 
referencing the other jury instructions given at the same time. Id. at 1230. After 
consideration, this Court determined that the objectionable jury instruction did not affect 
the outcome of the damages awarded. Id. 
In Cheves v. Williams, 993 P.2d 191 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court 
provided clear guidelines for appellate courts who are asked to review the propriety of a 
jury instruction: 
In reviewing a jury instruction, we consider the challenged instruction in 
context. "As we have repeatedly held, if the jury instructions as a whole fairly 
instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible error does not arise merely 
because one jury instruction, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have 
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been." Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d 474,478 (Utah 1999) 
(quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 741 (Utah 1996)) (other citations 
omitted). 
Furthermore, an error injury instructions may be harmless where the error is 
"'sufficiently inconsequential so that no reasonable likelihood exists that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" C T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 
484 (Utah 1999) (quoting Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Min. Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 
360 (Utah 1997)); see also C T., 977 P.2d at 484 (stating that we review "all of 
the jury instructions, the evidence, and closing arguments" to determine 
whether "it is highly probable that the jury considered each of the relevant... 
factors during their deliberations even though not specifically instructed to do 
so"). Finally, we will not reverse for errors in jury instructions if the 
complaining party "fail[s] to demonstrate how the court's refusal to adopt their 
proposed jury instructions prejudiced them." Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil 
Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1249 (Utah 1998). 
The trial court in this case included twenty-eight jury instructions. [See Appellant's 
brief, Addendum "B" for a copy of the jury instructions]. Appellant Hatch objects to the 
inclusion of a single jury instruction (#19) concerning equity. Jury instruction #19 
indicates: "A remedy of equity, and one who invokes it must have clean hands in having 
done equity himself." 
On October 26, 1999, the trial judge, the attorneys, and Appellee Sykes discussed 
the equity/clean hands jury instruction #19. Sykes requested the inclusion of the 
equity/unclean hands instruction. The trial judge indicated that he would consider 
whether or not to include the instruction and notify the parties in the morning. [See 
October 26, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, pp.3-4 (bate-stamped 002752)]. 
On October 27, 1999, the trial court reiterated that Plaintiffs (Appellant's) 
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counsel, Mr. Amott, had objected to the inclusion of the equity instruction, but that the 
court had decided to include the instruction despite the objection. [See October 26, 1999 
Transcript of Proceedings, 3:17-20 (bate stamped 002753)]. Later in the proceeding, 
Plaintiffs counsel explained that he objected to jury instruction #19 because the 
instruction improperly focused the jury on the alleged behavior of Mr. Hatch, while the 
real issue at trial concerned only a judgment that Mr. Hatch was attempting to collect. 
[See October 26, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 22:13 through 23:10 (bate stamped 
002753)]. 
Appellant recites the foregoing facts in its appellate brief. However, Appellant 
does not mention that the trial court provided an explanation for its decision to allow jury 
instruction #19 to be included. After Mr. Hatch's attorney objected to the inclusion of 
jury instruction #19, the trial court explained: 
Okay. I asked the question—I said, gee, is this a case of equity? And probably 
the closest, it does sound in terms of rescission, rescission of trust agreements. 
And rescission of the conveyances to the trust and the use by the trust of the 
property. Rescission is an equitable claim and the case does sound in equity. 
That's a very well understood and known axiom in the law. It means he who 
does equity—he who seeks equity, must do equity and have clean hands. 
I felt that counsel did a good job of arguing the points, as did Appellee Sykes. 
It will always be a relevant thing for a trier of fact to consider in any claim for 
equitable relief. So I gave it. It was requested and I gave it. [See October 26, 
1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 24:3-18 (bate stamped 002753)]. 
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Appellant's claims in the "Amended Complaint/' filed on August 27, 1996 focus 
on allegations that Appellee Sykes fraudulently transferred certain assets in order to avoid 
paying an earlier judgment and that Appellee Sykes exercised improper influence over the 
trustees, the trusts, and the assets of the trusts in an attempt to defraud creditors. 
Appellant Hatch's primary request for relief was to have certain transfers set aside on the 
basis of fraud. [See Amended Complaint, pp. 8-9]. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants/Appelles on all contested issues. 
In response to the Special Verdict Form, the jury found that Appellee Sykes did not 
fraudulently transfer any of his interest in the various properties with actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Furthermore, the jury found that Appellee Sykes did 
not exercise improper influence over the trusts, trustees, or trust assets with actual intent 
to hinder, delay or defraud lawful creditors. [See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment]. 
There is no indication anywhere that the jury gave any undue consideration to jury 
instruction #19, or that that jury instruction affected their decision to exonerate Sykes. 
Appellant cannot muster any credible evidence from the record which suggests otherwise. 
Appellant relies upon an argument that is logically flawed: namely, that because the jury 
returned to him an unfavorable verdict, jury instruction #19 must have been the cause of 
the unfavorable verdict. This argument is simply not supported by the underlying record. 
When this Court considers "all of the jury instructions, the evidence, and closing 
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arguments," in conjunction with the offending jury instruction #19, it is apparent that the 
jury's finding in favor of Appellee Sykes was based upon the jury's belief that Sykes did 
not engage in any acts of fraudulent transfer, with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 
creditors, and that Appellee Sykes did not exercise improper influence over the trusts, 
trustees or trust assets. [See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, pp. 1-2]. 
Jury instruction #2 clearly instructs the jury on Plaintiff s/Appellant's claims and 
the legal bases for the claims. Furthermore, jury instruction #4 warns the jury that their 
decision must be "based on the facts and the law, without regard to sympathy, passion, or 
prejudice." Jury instruction #7 directs the jury to disregard anything that the trial judge 
may have said or done that might make the jury think that the judge believed one witness 
over the other. Jury instruction #8 instructs the jury how to weigh the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
Together, these jury instructions correctly focus the deliberation process of the 
jury, and "level the playing field" for all parties. 
The jury instructions "as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law" in 
this case. Furthermore, "reversible error does not arise merely because one jury 
instruction, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have been." Even if this Court 
finds that jury instruction #19 was somewhat overreaching or even inappropriate, the 
evidence, the closing arguments, and the inclusion of the other balanced jury instructions 
all militate against a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in adding jury 
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instruction #19. 
Finally, Appellant has not offered a modicum of proof that jury instruction #19 
affected the outcome of the proceedings. Therefore, this Court should find that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by including jury instruction #19 and that, at any rate, 
the outcome of the proceedings was unaffected by its inclusion. 
3. The trial court did not err in granting William Christiansen's motion to 
dismiss; however, even if error was committed, William Christiansen's 
dismissal was appropriate and did not affect the outcome of the case. 
The propriety of a dismissal based on Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a question of law 
and reviewed under a correctness standard. See Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 987 P.2d 602, 
602 (Utah 1999). Furthermore, "Jurisdictional questions are ... reviewed for correctness." 
State v. Finlayson, 2004 UT 10,1f 5, 84 P.3d 1193. 
Appellant is correct in noting that Utah R. Civ. P. 4 requires service of a summons 
in conformity with that rule in order for a court to obtain jurisdiction over a party. [See 
Appellant's Brief, p. 28]. 
However, it is undisputed in this case that, although never served with a summons, 
William Christiansen filed a motion to dismiss and counterclaim (for attorney's fees and 
sanctions) with the trial court on November 21, 1996. By so doing, William Christiansen 
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court even though he was never properly 
served under the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 4. 
There appears to be no case law directly on point in Utah that addresses the 
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question of whether a court obtains jurisdiction over a defendant if that defendant is never 
served with process in compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 4, but the named defendant, 
nonetheless, files a motion to dismiss in response to the complaint. 
By analogy to the doctrine of "special appearances," however, it is reasonable to 
argue that a court may obtain jurisdiction over a defendant that has not been served with a 
summons by virtue of the defendant filing a motion to dismiss in response to the 
complaint. 
It is a widely established legal principle that a party who wishes to challenge the 
jurisdiction of a court may do so by entering a "special appearance." Generally, a party 
challenging jurisdiction must specifically argue against jurisdiction by making special 
appearance but may not argue any other element or issue in the case. Such a limitation is 
necessary so as to avoid conferring actual jurisdiction on the court before which the 
argument is made. See generally, Barlow v. Capo, 821 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1991); 
Guenther v. Guenther, 749 P.2d 628 (Utah 1988); Housley v. Anaconda Co., All P.2d 
390 (Utah 1967); Silver City Mercantile Co. v. District Court of Utah County, 195 P. 194 
(Utah 1920). 
If a party who enters a special appearance in order to contest jurisdiction is 
confined to arguing only the issue of jurisdiction in order to avoid conferring jurisdiction 
on the court hearing the matter, then surely a defendant who files a motion to dismiss in 
response to a complaint has acceded to the jurisdiction of the court, even if the defendant 
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was never properly served with a summons pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4. 
In the instant case, William Christiansen was obviously aware that he had been 
named as a defendant in Appellant Hatch's Amended Complaint. In response, Mr. 
Christiansen motioned the court for his own dismissal, which motion was granted. Such a 
response demonstrated his willingness to grant the trial court the necessary jurisdiction to 
decide the question. It would be an entirely different matter if William Christiansen had 
not made any response to the complaint and proper service had never occurred. As it 
stands, however, William Christiansen agreed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the 
trial court so that the trial court could determine whether or not he was a properly named 
party. 
As noted in the "Statement of Facts" section of this brief, Appellant had already 
attempted to involve William Christiansen in earlier litigation even after the court had 
dismissed William Christiansen. On appeal, Appellant Hatch decries the fact that he was 
compelled to pay Mr. Christiansen's attorney's fees and a $1,000.00 sanction fine. 
Nevertheless, given Appellant's lack of caution in naming Mr. Christiansen as a 
party, and an apparent willingness to contravene earlier court orders, the award of 
attorney's fees and $1,000.00 fine to Christiansen is entirely justified given the prior 
disposition of the court in earlier cases involving the same parties and issues. 
Even if this Court finds that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Mr. 
Christiansen's Motion to Dismiss and that the award of attorney's fees and sanction fines 
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were inappropriate, the fact remains that Appellant conceded that William Christiansen 
should not have been named as a defendant in the Amended Complaint. As explained in 
the "Statement of Facts" section of this brief, Appellant's response to Mr. Christiansen's 
Motion to Dismiss was partially denominated "Motion for Dismissal and/or Removal 
Christiansen as a Named Party Defendant" and in the body of that response, Appellant 
made motion upon the trial court to dismiss Mr. Christiansen or allow his name to be 
removed from the pleadings. [See "Statement of Facts", ^ 22-25, supra]. 
Whatever might be said on the issue of jurisdiction, all parties agreed that the 
dismissal of William Christiansen from the case was appropriate. In fact, Appellant does 
not allege on appeal that the case suffered a defect because Mr. Christiansen was 
dismissed. Appellant's argument is merely that the trial court's dismissal was not 
procedurally appropriate because Mr. Christiansen had not been served. 
This Court should find, under the "correctness" standard that the trial court did 
obtain jurisdiction over William Christiansen at the time he filed a motion to dismiss even 
though he was never served with a summons in compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 4. 
Moreover, this Court should sustain the award of attorney's fees and sanctions against 
Appellant Hatch and in favor of Mr. Christiansen. Finally, even if this Court finds that the 
trial court lacked proper jurisdiction over William Christiansen and that, accordingly, the 
attorney's fees award sanction fines were inappropriate, this Court should affirm the 
actual dismissal of William Christiansen from the case inasmuch as Appellant motioned 
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the trial court for the dismissal. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Appellant has not met the legal standard for establishing "abuse of discretion" in 
this case. The trial court, in dealing with a pro se defendant acted in accordance with the 
rules of evidence. The trial court instructed the jury to receive only certain aspects of 
Appellee Sykes testimony, and properly considered objections raised by Appellant's 
attorney. Additionally, Appellant's attorney failed to object to many of the statements 
offered by Appellee Sykes. 
Jury instruction #19 was appropriate given the underlying claims and defenses of 
the parties. Even if this Court finds jury instruction #19 to be inappropriate, this Court 
should find that the trial court did not err in submitting the instruction because the 
remaining jury instructions, evidence, and closing arguments provided a "level playing 
field" for the parties and that inclusion of jury instruction #19 did not prejudice the jury or 
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The trial court properly obtained jurisdiction over William Christiansen because he 
filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court. The attorney's fees and sanctions were 
appropriate given the actions of the Appellant vis-a-vis Mr. Christiansen in previous 
lawsuits. Mr. Christiansen's dismissal was appropriate and agreed to by Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted this (ff day of January, 2005. 
^ S T ^ 
^ O O W C H E I D E M A N & M C K A Y , L.L.C. 
Attorney for Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 1 
B- Kent Ludlowr USB No. 2010 
P.O. Box 95827 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Telephone: (801) 254-1096 
Attorney For The Trusts and Trustee 
FILED 
Fourth Ju^cl*! DUttk* Court 
IKS THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Howard H- Hatch, 
vs. 
Plaintiffi 
Dwane Sykes, et. al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950400719 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
This case was tried before a jury in an eight day trial from 
October 18 through October 22, 1999 and October 25 through October 27, 
1999. Plaintiff was represented by Ralph C. Amott, Defendant Trusts and 
Trustees were represented by B. Kent Ludlow, and Dwane Sykes represented 
himself. The jury having been duly instructed and polled at the request 
of Plaintiff, found in favor of Defendants on all contested issues of 
fact and more particularly found the following in response to the 
Special Verdict Form: 
1. Defendant Sykes did not transfer his interest in the 3-25 
acres of Carterville property by himself or others acting under his 
control, to a trust, and/or others, with actual intent to hinder, delayr 
or defraud creditors. 
2, Defendant Sykes did not transfer his interest in the Pleasant 
Grove properties by himself or by others acting under his control, to a 
trust, and/or others, with actual intent to hinder, defraud, or delay 
creditors* 
3. Defendant Sykes did not transfer his interest in the Raggozine 
property, the family home, by himself or by others acting under his 
control, to a trust, and/or others, with actual intent to hinder, delay, 
or defraud creditors. 
4. Defendant Sykes did not exercise such control over the 
transfers of the Pierroti rental home, by others so as to be a 
fraudulent conveyance done with actual intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud creditors. 
5 . Defendant Sykes did not exercise such improper influence or 
control over the trusts, trustees, and trust assets transferred to and 
in the trust with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud lawful 
creditors of Mr. Sykes, making these transfers not fraudulent 
conveyances. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The jury having found in favor of Defendants on all contested 
issues of fact including those specifically set forth on the Special 
Verdict Form, the Court concludes as follows: 
1, The 3.25 acres of Carterville Road property which is more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point on the east side of the 
Carterville Road, which point is North 520.03 feet and 
East 1381.56 feet from the West quarter corner of Section 
25, Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence North 3° 05T East along fence and 
Carterville Road 151,25 feet; thence North 74° 46V East 
130.92 feet to the center line of an existing road; 
thence North 64° 03f East 54,05 feet; thence South 85° 
12' East 48.11 feet; thence South 36° 26! East 92.31 
feet; thence leaving the center line of the existing 
road; thence South 90.80 feet; thence East 160.00 feet; 
thence North 96.92 feet; thence East 157,74 feet; thence 
South 16° 38' East 56.14 feet; thence South 6g 561 West 
70.89 feet; thence South 24° 42f East 148.45 feet; thence 
1^007 
North 82° 53f West 195.33 feet along a fence; thence 
South 6° 16f West 41-96 feet along a fence; thence North 
82° 42f West 305.94 feet along a fence; thence North 88° 
03f West 33.77 feet along a fence to J. Theron Smith 
property; thence North 2° 12f East 90.00 feet along fence 
and said property line; thence North 85° 18T West along a 
fence and property line 142.00 feet to beginning and to 
the Carterville Road, 
was not Fraudulently Conveyed by Dwane Sykes under any applicable laws 
of the State of Utah and is not subject to any claims of Plaintiff and 
may not be attached, executed upon or otherwise interfered with in any 
manner by Plaintiff. 
2. The Raggozine property which is more particularly described as 
follows: 
Commencing at a point North 620.0 feet and East 1667.4 
feet from the West quarter corner of Section 25, T6S, R2E, 
SLB&M; thence North 76 feet; thence East 160 feet; thence 
South 136 feet; thence West 160 feet; thence North 60 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
was not Fraudulently Conveyed by Dvane Sykes under any applicable laws 
of the State of Utah and is not subject to any claims of Plaintiff and 
may not be attached, executed upon or otherwise interfered with in any 
manner by Plaintiff. 
3. The Pleasant Grove properties which are more particularly 
described as follows: 
Parcel 1: 
Commencing 8,47 feet East of the Northwest corner of Lot 
3, Block 36, Plat "A", Pleasant Grove City Survey; thence East 
195.78 feet; thence South 200 feet; thence West 200.38 feet; 
thence South lg 19! West 12.4 feet; thence North 89° 25f West 
153.05 feet; thence North 0° 10' West 212.41 feet; thence 
South 89° 22' East 88,5 feet; thence South 1° 19' West 100 
feet; thence South 89° 22' East 70 feet; thence North 100 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 2; 
Commencing 149.16 feet West of the Northeast corner of 
0008 
Lot 4, Block 36, Plat "A", Pleasant Grove city Survey of 
Building Lots; thence West 43,34 feet; thence South 130.0 
feet; thence East 43.34 feet; thence North 130,0 feet to place 
of beginning. 
were not Fraudulently Conveyed by Dwane Sykes under any applicable laws 
of the State of Utah and are not subject to any claims of Plaintiff and 
may not be attached, executed upon or otherwise interfered with in any 
manner by Plaintiff. 
4. The Pierroti property which is more particularly described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point on the corner on the East edge of 
Carterville Road and on the South edge of Hope Lane, which 
point is North 884.66 feet and East 1,403.79 feet, more or 
less, from the West quarter corner of Section 25, Township 6 
South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
84° 10V East 100 feet along a hedge and fence on the South 
side of Hope Lane; thence South 3° 05f West 70 feet; thence 
North 84° 10V West 100 feet to the East edge of Carterville 
Road; thence North 3° 051 East 70 feet along the East side of 
Carterville Road to the point of beginning. 
was not Fraudulently Conveyed by Dwane Sykes under any applicable laws 
of the State of Utah and is not subject to any claims of Plaintiff and 
may not be attached, executed upon or otherwise interfered with in any 
manner by Plaintiff. 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs Complaint including, but not limited to all amendments 
thereto, and all claims made therein against any of the Defendants are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this "2£L day of P^S f 20J%?. 
Date: 
Date: 
B. Kent Ludlotf, A t to rney for 
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Date: 
Ralph C. Amott, Attorney for 
Plaintiff 
Date: 
B- Kent Ludlow, Attorney for 
Defendant Trusts and Trustees 
y 
Date: rJr; f, £»* 
Dwane 6yK£s, 5p6 Se 
ADDENDUM 2 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F. HATCH, MARJORIE S. 
HATCH AND UNIVERSITY AVENUE 




ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
DWANE J« SYKES, VIRGINIA 
FLYNN and WILLIAM 
CHRISTIANSEN, d/b/a ARAPIAN 
VALLEY LIVESTOCK CO., 
Defendants. 
) 
ORDER (long title, 
below) 
CIVIL NO. 63,695 
Hon. David L. Mower 
DWANE J. SYKES, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ANTHONY RAGOZZINE and 
RUTH RAGOZZINE, 
Defendants. 
CIVIL NO. 57,125 




HOWARD F. HATCH, ET AL., 
Defendants. 
CIVIL NO, 57,127 
0253 
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Hatch et al. v. Zions et al*, Case number 63
 f 695, 57,127 and 
57,125r 
Order on Mr, Christiansen's motions (1) to dismiss and (2) for 
attorney's fees, Page -2-
ORDER ON MR. CHRISTIANSENS MOTIONS 
(1) TO DISMISS AND (2) FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 
Defendant Christiansen has asked the Court to dismiss any 
claims against him and to award him some attorney's fees. The 
court intends to grant the requests. 
First, I will analyze the situation in light of the motion 
to dismiss* 
ANALYSIS IN RE MOTION TO DISMISS 
One of the claims in case number 63,695 was for damages 
against Zions Bank arising out of a trustee's sale conducted 
many years ago. Mr* Christiansen was the successful bidder and 
purchaser at that sale. 
Plaintiffs' claims were that the sale, where their property 
had been sold, had been improperly announced or scheduled and 
improperly conducted* lfImproperlyw may be too weak a word to 
describe plaintiffs' claims - they said that the bank and Mr. 
Christiansen and other defendants conspired together to 
schedule and to conduct an illegal sale* 
In any event, however, plaintiffs have now settled their 
claims against Zions Bank. In the process of settling, the 




Hatch et al. v. Zions et al., Case number 63,695, 57,127 and 
Order on Mr. Christiansen's motions (1) to dismiss and (2) for 
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Plaintiffs ... stipulate ... that the trustee's sale 
... was a bona fide, arm's length, non-collusive, 
valid and binding ... sale. Plaintiffs ... abandon ... 
all claims ... which ... challenge ... the validity 
... of ... the title of the purchaser. 
Admittedly, plaintiffs' stipulations were subject to 
certain conditions. But, so far as I know, all the conditions 
have been met. 
Plaintiffs have no further cause of action against Mr. 
Christiansen. His motion to dismiss is granted. 
ANA-LYSIS IN RE MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Mr. Christiansen has asked for an award of attorney's fees. 
He limits his request to the time period when bankruptcy case 
number 89B-05176 was filed and open. This case was filed in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah by the 
plaintiffs as the petitioners. 
Mr. Christiansen's request is based on the claim that 
plaintiffs should have notified the parties and the Court of 
(1) the filing and (2) the dismissal of the bankruptcy matter. 
Both events occurred during the pendency of these proceedings. 
Plaintiffs gave no notice. 
Plaintiffs' response to the motion is that no notice was 
required because a petitioner before the United States 
Bankruptcy Court can elect to trigger the automatic stay or not. 
This response is a^jgl2S5e£3i of 11 USC 362, which 
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Order on Mr. Christiansen's motions (1) to dismiss and (2) for 
attorney's fees# Page -4-
contains words of mandate (e.g., "shall11) • The filing of a 
petition triggers the automatic stay and automatically 
transfers all the petitioner's non-exempt property to the 
trustee. 
Defendant's motion for attorney's fees is granted, subject 
to this condition: defendant must provide proof of the amount 
claimed within 30 days. A sworn affidavit will be allowed as 
prooff subject, of course, to objection. 
Hi /7/u 1\ Dated: i / ' ' /19 JdU^ 
>
 David L. Mower 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order on Mr. Christiansen's motions (1) to dismiss 
and (2).for attorney's fees was served by U. S Mail, on 
the /^-S» day of April, 1991, on the following: 
Spencer F. Hatch, 19221 Sherborne Lane, 
Huntington Beach, Ca. 92646 
Howard F. Hatch, 843 South 1150 East, Pleasant 
Grove (84062) 
Sam Primavera, 37 East 400 North, Provo, Utah 
(84601) 
Dwane Sykes, 1511 South Carterville Road, orem, 
Utah (84058) 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the motion to dismiss claims against William 
Christiansen and the order for dismissal of claims against William Chiistiansen were sent first 
class postage prepaid on 2.) day of AJ^^^J^^ 19 <fc to: 
Ralph C. Amott 
60 E. 100 S. Stel02 
Provo, UT 84606 
Clark R. Nielsen 
Henriod and Nielsen 
1160 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004 
Gordon Duval 
Duval, Hansen, Witt and Morley, LLC 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Dwane Sykes 
1511 S. Carterville Rd. 
Orem, UT 84057 
Max Ferre 
1973 R 2400 N. 
Layton, UT 84004 
R. Kent Ludlow 
Nielsen and Senior 
P.O. Box 11808 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
ADDENDUM 3 
0024 
Sam Primavera (5413) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3707 N Canyon M. Ste JA 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 2264993 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 






| Civil No. 810457127 
i HONORABLE JUDGE MOWER 
Dale: 5 July 1995 
Being fully advised on the matter by a hearing on June 30 1995 and by arguments 
and testimony received, the court makes the following ruling: 
1) The action of selling the Mr. William C. Christiansen's property by sheriff's sale is 
not supported by the requisite order from this or any other court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
2) Any reopening of the question of whether Mr. William Christiansen was a 
"strawman" of Mr. Sykes under the facts of this case is barred by the doctrine of 
©025 
"res judicata*, inasmuch as this issue was dealt with in a prior order which was 
subsequently upheld on appeal. 
3) The sheriff's sale of Mr. William C. Christiansen's 3 acres of real property located 
next to the property at 1511 S. Carterville road is quashed. 
4) Mr. Hatch is also ordered not to attempt the attachment or sale of any property, the 
title to which is in the name of William C Christiansen. 
5) Attorney's fees are granted under Rule 11 to Mr. Christiansen in the amount of 
$350.00; inasmuch as the attempt to attach Mr. Christiansen's property was 
frivolous, obviously prohibited by "res judicata" and proper procedure was not 
followed since Mr. Christiansen was not properly served nor made a party to this 
suit thereby wasting the time of counsel and this court 
Judge Mower 
PREPARED BY: Sam Primavera 
746 E 3800 N. 
Provo, UT 84604 
(801) 226-0993 
ADDENDUM 4 
Howard F. Hatch 
843 South 1150 East 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
(801)785-4818 / 785-8000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F. HATCH, 
v. 
Plaintiff, 
DWANE J. SYKES, DENNIS L. SYKES, 
BENOY & ANGELA TAMANG, Trustees 
of the so-called "Irrevocable 
Trust Agreement", aka "THE DWANE SYKES 
AND PATRICIA SYKES CHILDREN'S TRUST 
AND/OR THE DWANE AND PATRICIA SYKES 





The Plaintiff, Howard F- Hatch, complains of the Defendants under 
the Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Utah Code Section 25-6-1 et seg,, as 
follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff resides in Pleasant Grove, Utahr and acts com-
plained of in the main took place within Utah Countyr Utah. 
2. Defendants Dwane J. Sykes and the Tamangs live in Orem, Utah 
County, Utah. 
3- Defendant Dennis L- Sykes is a resident of the State of 
Alaska-
4- The real property transfered to the alleged trust or other 
Defendants for the purpose of defrauding creditors is located in Utah 
Countyr Utah. 
5- Defendant Johnny M. Iverson is a resident of Utah County, 
living in Highland, Utah. 
6. Defendant Max S« Ferre is a resident of the State of Utah, 
living in Layton, Davis Countyr Utah, 
7. The original acts of Defendant Dwane J. Sykes which led to 
the claims of Plaintiff creditor giving rise to the subsequent judg-
ment, and hence this action, have all been committed within the juris-
diction of this State and for the more part within the confines of 
this County. 
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS 
8. On or about the 6th of June, 1974, Plaintiff entered into an 
option agreement with Defendant Dwane Sykes for the purchase of 
certain land in Utah County subject of this present action which then 
belonged to the Plaintiff. 
9. Said option was taken in the name of Defendant Dennis Sykes, 
ostensibly for tax purposes, but it would now appear for the purpose 
of avoiding creditors. 
10• On or about the 13th of November, 1974, said option was 
converted into a Uniform Real Estate Contract between the parties. 
11- On or about the 30th of November, 1974, Dennis Sykes 
assigned said contract to Dwane J. Sykes. 
12. On or about May 26, 1975, a deed was issued to Dennis Sykes 
by Plaintiff in consumation of the preceeding option and contract, but 
which title soon thereafter passed to Dwane Sykes by Warranty Deed 
dated July 28, 1975. 
13, On or about June 7, 1978r title to said property was quit-
claimed to Dennis L. Sykes for the purpose of avoiding creditors * 
14. At or about the same time, Dwane Sykes conveyed his interest 
in other property which he had acquired from Mr. and Mrs- Anthony 
Raggozine and others to Dennis Sykes for a similar purpose. See 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto for a particular description of said 
properties. 
15. Dwane Sykes, during the intervening yearsr has had recorded 
bogus encumbrances against the subject real properties for the purpose 
of creating the illusion that these were encumbered. His purpose in 
doing so would appear to have been to defraud potential creditors, 
including the Plaintiff, so they would not seek to execute against 
them. We base this allegation on the fact that prospects of an action 
which might result in a judgment against Mr* Sykes have been very real 
since problems began between the parties in the late 1970's. See copy 
of Judgment entered in the consolidated cases, Civ. No- 57,127 and 
63r695 in this jurisdiction which is attached as Exhibit "B". 
16- These charges were brought by the present Plaintiff as early 
as 1981, and amplified in a follow-on action in 1983, which resulted 
in the money judgment just referred to. Other parties have been 
pursuing Dwane Sykes legally during these same several, years. 
17. On or about the 31st of December, 1987, Defendant Dennis 
Sykes, in what would appear to be a sworn affidavit, asserted a 
"contract interest" in certain real property on behalf of Defendant 
Dwane Sykes, which rear property is more fully described in Exhibit 
,PCM, attached hereto and made a .part of this action thereby, to wit: 
l^ ]002 
a 3 1/4 acre parcel of land located on Carterville Road in Orem, Utah, 
and ostensibly held in the name of one William Christiansen, but which 
would appear, in fact, to be property belonging to and used by Defen-
dant Dwane SyKes. Plaintiff alleges that said document entitled 
"Application for Assessment and Taxation of Agricultural Land" is a 
forgery, was illegally notarized {since by one having a direct inter-
est therein, Patricia Sykes) but also an attempt to defraud either 
Utah County or the Plaintiff. 
18. In the meantime, other real property was placed in the name 
of Defendant Johnny Iverson for the same purpose, i.e., defrauding 
Plaintiff and/or other potential creditors, but later transferred to a 
J. Glade Dursteller. See legal descriptions in attached Exhibit "D", 
19. Demand was made by Defendant James Sauers in a letter March 
9, 1994f to said Iverson that he convey his interest in one of thoses 
two pieces of real property to him, Sauers, as the "trustee" of an 
alleged trust so that a sale of said property might be consumated. 
See Exhibit "E" attached, 
20* That on or about the 3rd of June, 1994, Dwane Sykes 
mysteriously produced for recording a Warranty Deed allegedly executed 
by Johnny M- Iverson describing two parcels of real property subject 
of this action, to wit: Lot 29, Plat "A" in Lynnwood Park Subd., Orem, 
Utah, and a parcel of land and house located at about 1475 South 
Carterville Road, Orem, Utah County, Utah, as described in Exhibit 
"D"• We allege that this instrument, if not a total forgery, was 
illegally notarized, and therefore void. 
10003 
21. Heretofore, Johnny Iverson had refused to convey title to the 
Lynnwood Park property until certain obligation due him were addres-
sed. This property, along with unrecorded title to a house and lot at 
approx. 1475 South Carterville, Orem, Utah, as described on Exhibit 
f,DM, ve allege, was being held all along by Mr. Iverson for the sole 
purpose of defeating creditors of Dwane Sykes. 
22. As per the deed referred to in Paragraph 20f title was osten-
sibly passed to Mr. Dusteller, and from him to Defendant Sauers by 
Deed recorded in the Utah County Records as Entry No* 46745, Book 
3460, Page 177, a copy of which document is attached as Exhibit "PM, 
We allege this to be a fraudulent conveyance and should be set aside. 
23. That on or about July 15, 1987, Dwane Sykes conveyed by Quit 
Claim Deed nine separate tracts of land located in Utah County to 
Defendant Max S. Perre without consideration and for the exclusive 
purpose of defrauding creditors. A copy of said deed is attached1 as 
Exhibit V . 
24. On or about the 5th of February, 1984, Dwane J. Sykes con-
veyed by Warranty Deed title to a parcel of land in Utah County, 
containing approximately 23 acres, belonging to Defendant Dwane J* 
Sykes, without adequate consideration and for the sole and exclusive 
purpose of defrauding creditors- See Exhibit MH" attached. 
25. On or about the 8th of February, a jury rendered its verdict 
granting a money judgment against the Defendant Dwane J. Sykes and 
others in excess of $500,000, to wit: Howard F. Hatch^ Plaintiff, vs. 
Dennis L- Sykes, Dwane J. Sykes, Patriot o~i— 
0004 
Civil No. 810457127, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, State of 
Utah. See attached copy of Judgment, Exhibit "Bu, 
26. On or about the 13th day of February, 1995, just 5 days after 
jury verdict was rendered against Dennis L. Sykes, Dwane J. Sykes and 
Patricia Sykes, a quit claim deed was executed by Dennis in favor of 
the Tamangs, conveying title to four separate pieces of real property 
in Utah County. We allege that these properties were previously held 
in Dennis Sykes1 name for the benefit of Dwane Sykes, and that the so-
called trust(s) to whom conveyance has been made are a sham and were 
set up for the benefit of Dwane Sykes, have been controlled by him 
contrary to law and are intended for the primary purpose of defrauding 
creditors and therefore should be set aside. (See two page document 
attached as Exhibit "A" entitled "Quit-Claim Deed"). 
27. Since that time, Plaintiff has been attempting to execute on 
properties belonging to the debtor Dwane J. Sykes without success due 
to his effective efforts in conveying or having conveyed the subject 
properties to others without consideration, or lacking in adequate 
consideration, for the purpose of defrauding Plaintiff or other credi-
tors. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
1. The Plaintiff therefore prays that this court will declare 
all of the conveyances of the subject properties as described in the 
Exhibits attached hereto and made a part of this complaint are null 
and void and will ascertain the true owner of the 3 1/4 acre parcel 
being held in the name of w-i n-**™ ^—J 
121005 
portion, if not all, belongs to Defendant Dvane Sykes and is suscept-
able to execution-
2- We would also ask that this court examine the various encum-
brances and/or notices of interest which may appear of record to 
encumber said real properties, and to judge them to be void and of no 
effect, setting them aside and placing all of the subject properties 
under a constructive trust pursuant to execution thereon for the 
purpose of satisfying the judgment obtained against Defendant Dvane J. 
Sykes• 
3. We further ask this court to grant us any reasonable attorney 
fees expended in this action, together with all allowable court costs. 
Respectfully submitted this j*CT(A> day of November, 1995. 
0006 
^Ktitg/T /f/L s/~ 
Whereas Dennis I,, Sykea, aka Dennif Lynn Sykes has held 
property In hia personal name, ai nominee and ea Trustee for an 
Irrevocable Trust datad June 1, 197B aa set forth in the two 
(2) Schedule* -A" attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein; and 
Whereas, Dannie L* Sykes ceased to serve as Trustee ot the 
aaid Trust; and 
Whereea, Banoy and Angela Tomang have bean appointed aa 
Trustees of said Trusts and agreed to serve as Trustees of said 
Trust* and are the currently serving Trustees of said Trust) 
and 
Whereas, Dennis L, Sykea intands to convey any title he may 
have aa the former Trustee of said Truet in real property 
located In Utah County to the currently serving Trustees of 
said Trust; 
NOW THEREFOREi 
Dennio L. Sykes, aka Dennis Lynn Sykes, Grantor/ hereby 
QU1T-CLAIBS to Banoy and Angela Taraang, Trustees, of 1035 Bast 
1630 Southr Oram, Utah 64 056, or their successors in interest 
aa Trustees, Grantees, for the eum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER 
GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the following described tracts 
of land In Utah County, State of Utaht 
Parcel li 
Beginning at a point on the east aide of the 
Cartervllle Road, which point le North 520.03 feet and Beat 
1381,56 feet from the Meat quarter cornter of Section 2S, 
Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
thence North 3° 05' Eaat along fence and Cartervllle Road 
151.25 feet; thence North 74° 46V Eaat 130.92 feet to the 
center line of an existing road; thence North 64« 03' East 
54.05 feetr thence South 85° 12' Eaat 4fi,li feet; thonca 
South 36° 26' Eaat 92.31 feat; thence leaving the center 
line of .the existing road; thence South 90.60 feet; thence 
Eaat 160.00 feat; thence North 96.92 feet; thence east 
157.74 feet; thence South 16° 36' Eaat 59,14 feet; thence 
South 6° 56' Vest 70.89 feat; thence South 24° 42' East 
14Br45 feet; thence North 62° 53' West 195.33 feet along a 
fence; thence South 6° 16' Vast 41.96 feet along a fence; 
thence North 62° 42' Vest 305.94 feet along a fence; thence 
North BB° 03" wast 33.77 feat along a fBnce to J. Theron 
Smith property/ thence North 2° 12' Eaat 90.00 feet along 
fence and said property line; thence North 85° IB' Ueat 
along a fence and property line 142.00 feet to beginning and 
to the Cartervllle Road, iHi 94 .M F' 3/»?l H 7 A 2 
FrAHDALL A . COV/JN6TON 
UTAH COUNTY KC'CQRDCft , 
sf'weo w 
t 0013 <**?<*~r II 
1*3007 
CUT 9 * 2 1 B K 3 6 2 I ^ 2 6 3 
Together with all eaaemente, acceaaet, right* of way 
and right! in and to aald property. 
Pareal 2i 
Commencing 0,47 feat Bait of tha Horthveat corner of 
Lot 3/ Block 36, Plat "A", Pleeaant Orova City Sarvayi 
thanca Eaat 195,78 feet? thanca South 200 faatj thanca Watt 
200.38 feat; thanca South 1° 19' Wait 12,4 feetj thanca 
North 09° 25' Weat 153.05 faatj thanca tiorth 0« 10' wait 
212.41 faatf thanca South 69° 22' Eaet 60,5 taetj thanca 
South 1* 19' Neat 100 faatj thanca South 09* 22' Kaet 70 
faati thanca North 100 faat to tha point of bagInning. 
Parcel 3i 
Commencing 149.16 faat Wait of tha Northeaet corner of 
Lot *, Block 36, Plot "A", Pleeaant Grova city Survey ot 
Building U>ta; thanca Vast 43.3* foot? thanca South 130.0 
faatf thanca Eaftt 43.34 faatj thanca Horth 130,0 faat to 
place of beginning. 
Parcel 4i 
Commencing at a point North 620.0 faat and Beat 1667.4 
faat from tha Want quarter cornar of Section 25, T6B, R2E, 
SLBfcMf thanca North 76 feet; thanca Eaat 160 feeti thanca 
South 136 faat] thanca treat 160 feat; thanca North 60 faat 
to tha point of taginning. 
Vltnaaf tha hand of aald Grantor this -* day of 
F+tr »*£ 
Dannie L, Sykee ' 
STKTZ OF UTAH ) 
i ea, 
COUNT* OP SALT UKE ) 
Oh tha /3i>day of r£$JL*AAi , l9fS_, personally 
appeared before me Dennla L. Byket, the algner of tha foragoing 
Quit-Claim Dead, who duly acknowledged before ma that ha 
executed the aane< 
Ky ComffiiBBlon Expiration Data f ^ ^ X*+^'^tri£&/ 
and Addreaa arei Notary PublTc /^mam*B' 
0012 
@008 
" & " 
Howard F. Hatch, pro se 
843 South 1150 East 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Ph: (801)785-4818/785-8000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS L. SYKES, DWANE 
AND PATRICIA SYKES, 
VS. 




1 CIVIL NO, B10457127 
i JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER 
Defendant and Counterclaimant 
This action came on trial before the Court and a jury on February 
6, 1995, Honorable David L. Mower, presiding, for the sole purpose of 
determining the extent of damages, the issue of liability having been 
granted in favor of the Defendant/counterclaimant, Howard F- Hatch, 
by default previously entered as against all three of the Plaintiffs, 
Dennis L, Sykes, Dwane J, Sykes and Patricia Sykes. The matter of 
damages having been duly assessed and the jury having duly rendered 
its verdict* 
It is Ordered and Adjudged: that the defendant/counterclaimant, 
Howard F. Hatch, recover of the plaintiffs, Dennis L- Sykes, Dwane J. 
^sro^SM?-^ Dt>-
Sykes and Patricia Sykes, the sura of 0510,Q3C -00, with interest 
thereeon after 4udgmefrtr at the rate of 9,22 percent per annum as 
provided by law,^and his costa of action including attorneys fees; ^COL 
Such amounts in judgment as determined by the jury are broken 
down as follows: 
FOR THE CONVERSION OF WATER STOCK; $6,000 plus interest at the 
legal rate from the time of conversion September 2, 1975, until 3-^ dg-
BwaJb-—and -thereafter until paid. Said liability to be distributed 
equally between the three oiain^**-
$009 
FOR TRESPASS: 530,000 pjtes~-£gfceau-a-fc at the legal rata from ttofr 
0 ^ ±i«e-CF£-^hidgn!S»^^ said liability to be distributed equally 
between plaintiffs Dwane J, Sykes and Patricia Sykes. 
FOR SLANDER OF TITLE CAUSING THE LOSS OF REAL PROPERTY: $105/000 
plus interest at the legal rate from the time of loss May 4/ 1983/ 
until jgjAgpffmirt. aacl lhfar.frar#*^ ri~uuLil p<±4d. Said liability to be dis-
tributed equally between the three plaintiffs. 
FOR INTERFERENCE IN AN ADVANTAGEOUS BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP: 
$10/000 plus-—xnLmes-L at Llie legal-rate from-the—ti*ne—e€—^^grneBt. /-
P^until ^ai»d. Said liability to be distributed equally between the 
three plaintiffs. 
AS PUNITIVE DAMAGES: ?225/000 g^^-4Trbel^e^t^^t the loga-1—Mrfce ° 
QV-" feeeifi—feh«—time erf judgment until -jfraJid. Said liability to be dis-
tributed equally between the three plaintiffs. 
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE AUGMENTED 
IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN 
COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE 
ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
JLH—pq-yM^^ +o thi fi-yAi^n ha^3 p^pearfifl p ™ ^ Sfee- 3nrlgaentr-Pu 
doctors ' r^ftr^rrrr in nn fallows: 1^11 South Cir f Qnn'i^ R^ a*7—-03ee*ft-r 0*^ . 
tLtah 8 4058• -—She—a-3rfc^rnate addrocc of judgment debtor f—Dennis— i r r D ^ 
.gyfeids, isr-1315 Cuiduvd bt^ggtr^i^pr^^ Ala^k^. 0^ 
ENTERED by the court this S* day of V&L&k, 1995. 
"C" 
P»ga * e l . 
APPUCATION FOR ASSESSMENT AND TAXATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND 
1069 FARMLAND ASSESSMENT ACT 
At Provkfrt Under Wa/i Code Ann, §50-*e$ through fSP-5-7G5 (1953. ax amended) 
rq B E T Y P E D O H P R I N T E D I N I N K 
Ownerd): Dcnnla L, Sykcg 
529 54 6974 
. Social Security No._ 
Mailing AWtoU* ?. 0, Box 436 - Provp, UT _M60_3-04 36 
Lessee (II applicable) , . Social Security No._ 
Application Is hereby made for aafresamenl and faaaiiDn of the following legolly described agricultural land. 
ENT4-4B1S fr 2 4 S C PG 2 3 * 5 
HJKA * REtD UTAH COUMTt SECORDER DEP AT 
19E7 DEC 21 4:36 Pfl FEE W-00 
OHv ftl Appllcallon 1 2 ~ 3 1 . ~ £ 7 - . 
County . Utah . Properly Serial Na(s) fcECOftDEO FOR PENHIS STKE5 
Complete Legal Description (a)' fAttach adalfhnoi pvgas (I necesseryj 
P r o p e r t y S e r i a l Number: l ° i 0 0 $ t Q 0 0 3 : 1 4 2 
0^0 U t a h County Number i E-3?3- l?~<» 
Owner Name r 5YKE3, DENMIS L 
T*x O f f t M e t Ki 90 
A c r e s * 0 . 5 0 
COM N 420 FT A £ 1 4 4 7 . 4 FT FR u 1/4 COR SEC 2 3 , T 6 S , R 2 E, 5LM; N 74 F T | £ 1$ 
0 F T | fi 133 F T ; U 140 FT - N 40 FT TO BEG»R£A , 5 0 OF AN AC. 
Tola! number of aces Included In this application, &r?2 A. ^.9" 
1 CERTIFY THAT: 
1. The agricultural lend covered by this application constitutes no less man fi^tioiifiguouf acres excoaive of fho 
homeslle and other non-agrieuliural acreage (Sao Utah Code Ann ££9-$»87 (7) for waiver.): 
2 Tho above described eligible land la currently devoted to agricultural use and ha* been aa devoted lor two 
successive years fmmedlaiaiy preceding me ta* year lor which valuation under this act Is requested, 
3 The gross aalea (tai reportable Income) ol agricultural product produced ihereon have *v*r&qe4 ai leaai Jl.uou 
par fear lor the lw© year period immediately preceding the tax year in Issue Stele; Ulfipfnc' »** records win fre used 
Ap-Yftfily Income, and 
4 I am fully m n j ihe (Iveyear rollback provision which becomes effective upon a change In ihe use ol all or part 
ol the above deacrlbod eligible land I understand tho provision of ihe rollback rex which requires notice lo the 
county assessor of any Change In U9a of »n« land to Other than agriculture, and that a 100 percent penally Of Ihe 
computed roil-back lax duo win be tmpoaea on failure to notify the aaseasor wlinln 90 dBy* after change In land 




DENNIS I . 5YKES 
AppUtmnt 
and 4uecule0 \h*9 documanf o«Jl 
Bppo»r#d otfore r,»e 
' i (lay of 
fiqaldlnQ/l>|^r^e^!gr<^:gir _ ^ ^ _ 
A^lcuWp eyirirdwnvrmustba til** ©Aof before January 1. ol 
iKe CurreWli^yeaj^ LalOTllingi •(!» o* ecpepted tor eo day* aliar 
ArftfjSrF fnipfarrfaymfJplO't $23 penalty 
Dklrb>uu»n J w&ir4CJd*J*>A<J — A w i w 
The haraln application let Pay 19BH 
Of ApprOv-d f*i/0>ec/ fo review/ 
O Denied 
By 
= £ 2 ^ Covntw 
County nteardar Fee _ 
Eftfty NO . 
FiltO . 
Book 




nEire omsnom TO COUUTT AaaetsOH 0009 
Bon 
ENT46818 BK 2 4 8 0 P6 2 8 6 
GREENBELT APPL1 .1*1 1&4 ^GE 2 OF 2 
Yttrt 1981... 
ProptAty Strlfcl Hurler «9*006l0004jl42 Ta* District #i 90 
Old Utah Countv JK,b*r _ 575-19-B' Acresi 2.52 
Own tr «vi/i i -vr-, "--E'vWS L 
COM ON E SlCr 3* ;»vrf;-.RVILLE ROAD N 520.08 FT * E 1381.56 FT FR W 1/4 COR SEC 25 
, T6SP R2E, L/Mz - 4 05' E ALONG FENCE & CARTERVlLLE ROAD 151,25 FTf N 74 46 1/2 
' € 190.92 FT TO CEN LINE OF A ROAD) N 64 03' £ 54.05 FTi S 85 12' E 48.11 FTi 
S 36 26' E 92*31 FTf LEAVING CEN LINE OF R0AD| S 90.80 FTf E 160 FTf N 96.92 FT| 
E 51,74 FT* S 243 FT| N 82 53'W 27.33 FT ALONG A FENCEf S 6 16'W 41 .96 FT ALONG 
A FENCEl N 82 42'U 305.94 FT ALONG FENCEf N 88 03'W 33.77 FT ALONG A FENCE TO J. 
THERON SMITH PROP| N 2 12' E 90 FT ALONG FENCE *WD SD PROP LINE| N 85 18'W ALONG 
A FENCE & PROP LINE 142 FT TO BEG * TO CARTERVILLE ROAD. AREA 2.52 ACRES. 
Property Serial Number I I9i006l0002i242 Tax District Hi 90 
Old Utah County Number* E-575-19 Acres* 1-97 
Owner Name I CHRISTIANSEN, UILLIAM (DENNIS SYKES, CONTRACT BUYER) 
COM AT A PT OF E SIDE OF CARTERVILLE ROAD N 671 .06 FT & 1389.7 FT FR W 1/4 COR S 
EC 25, T 6Sf R 2E, SLMf N 3 05' E ALONG FENCE * tARTERVlLLE ROAD 221-28 FTf S 84 
10 1/2' E 323.18 FT ALONG FENCEf N 41 57' E 61.04 FTf N 37 55'E 166.14 FTf N 52 
18'E 10 FTf S 373 FTf U 51.74 FTf N 39.08 FTf (J 160 FTf S 45.2 FTf N 36 26'U 92 
.31 FTf N 85 12'U 48.11 FTf S 64 03'W 54.05 FT| S 74 46'30»U 130.92 FT TO BfcG. 
AREA 2.13 ACRES, LESS J 6 ACRE. 
Property Serial Number! I9i006:0017il42 Tax District Hi 30 
Old Utah County Number: EE-828-3 Acres* 0.69 
Owner Namet SYKES, D£rt*I8 L 
COM N 656.92 FT & 1897.12 FT FR U 1/4 COR SEC 23, T6B, R2EP SLMf N 90 E 106 FTf 
S 16 38'E 58-14 FTf S 6 56'W 70.89 FTf S 24 42'£ 148.45 FTf N 82 53'W 168 FTf N 
243 FT TO BEG. AREA .69 ACRE 
Property Serin1 Number J 19t006i0018i242 T*x District ft» 30 
Old Utah County Number* EE-828-4 Acr**i 1.04 
Owner Name 7 CHRISTlrfV*B£N% UILLIAM (DERMIS SYKES, CONTRACT dUVER> 
COM N 1041.6 FT & E 1873.93 FT FR W 1/4 COR SEC 25P T6S, R2E. SLMf N 52 18'E 27. 
64 FTf N 7* iS'E 26.42 FTf N 83 51 'E 59.36 FT| S 7 29'E 194.82 FTf S 13 Ol'W 83. 
42 FT) S 1 53'W 129.41 FTf S 16 38'E 9,43 FT* W 106 FTf N 373 FT TO BEG. AREA 1 
.04 ACRES 
Property Serial Number* 19t006*0020i242 Tax District lit 90 
Old Utah County Numberi E-575-19-C Acres* 0.16 
Owner Name i UNIVERSITY AVE DEV ASSOC <DEWIS SYKES CONTACT BUYER) 
COM N 884.66 FT & E 1403.79 FT FR Ml/4 COR, SEC 25f T6S, R2E. SLMf S 84-«U'30*E 





JOHMMY 'I. 1VCRS0N 
/r D / ' 
fliiWM of V. tl."Box 436 , Provo 
CONVEY #odWAMANT i© 
4 . GIAOC milST€LL£fi 
Coumy of Utah 34603 V»i* *f umi , hcrcfiy 
EMT +47++ 8K 3 4 6 0 pG 1 7 6 
NINA B ACID WW CD RECOKDEft BY flB 
1994 JUH 3 4i3< Ml FEE 10.00 
KECQfiOCfi FOR JAKES U GAUtRG 
gi«n<ec of P. 0 , 0 o x ' 4 3 6 , Provo Utah 6460J-04J6 
(or tht turn of $10.00 h o t h e r <iood and valuab I c o n s i d e r a t i o n , r e c e i v e d tn hand, 
the fotfowittf *ucill>*4 i t tcts *f I«n4 In Or e m , U t a h County, 5f Jie of Ifufc: 
SCHEOJLE *&• 
«l. 
ilFuitad In Utah CwmrrTttiirof UUfi 
f91lnnlii« *t « point on ttto wroor on tho Not odf» «f * « / " £ " > ! 
Rood •** tin tho Booth odg* or Ho*m Unt. ohlch point la Hartli M*.0« 
foot ond Cast MQJ.If f « * , *oro or «•«, ' ™ * J ^ L ^ o " « I 
and HiMdlorii thoncO Booth »4 do*, 1 0 l / * * • • * • « '™\S%*1* 
httfo* and fooca on tho Booth Jldo of Hooo Law; thane* Smith 3 do^ 
•5- «oot ?* foot: thoiico Worth M d.g. ^ 1/2 'Jioatjoo ftft ta tN 
East odga of CartanrUlo Koadj thoncO North 3 d*g* 0* *.Mt. V 
along trio Cost aldo of cortonrfMo Hood to th« point of boolimtno, 
and 
ft, LOT 2 9 , MLAr *A* f tttfWUUO PARK SU8Dm$IOh\ 0REH« UTAH, ACCOS0IH6 fo THE 
OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE IN THE OFFICE OT IHE RECORDER l/MH CQUMTT, UfAH 
wrTHEii, rtie hind of latO gwrtw , lfali 
Signf U |n in* picfcnco of 
IZth 
d l f d ueceraoer 
J JOHNNY f C 1VERS0N 
A . D . 15 92 
STATE OT UTAH $ 
Co««yc|UTAM t" 
oatiic 12th diypf December 
A. D« 1*92 penoAklfjr »ppe*tfe4 feefig* me 
JOHNNY * , IVERS0H 
i ta *lgo« of tilt wiihlfi litftrameai *hi* 4»ly 
acknowledged to mo Out h« csccotod die *«mea 
Cotofti|.p|ofiw6«^ ^ * ^ r r • / ? ^ A T W 
RECORDING DATA 
Entry No, Foci 
AECOWJED Q IHDEjEDD Q 
PLATTED D AKTIUCTEPD 
COMPARED D DELIVERED O 
\ *>>-.- -S 
©013 
March 9, 1994 
Box 436 Provo, UT 84601 
Johnny M. Iverson 
7096 W 10400 N 
American Fork, UT 84004 
Dear Mr* Iverson: 
As you know, as the former trustee for the Sykes children, title to the 
house at 949 E 1120 S, Orem, Utah, Is still held In your name as nominee for 
the trust. As you are also aware, this house has sold and the closing Is 
set for 1:00 p.m. Thursday, Marcn 10, 1994p at Access Title Co*, 1455 So. 
State St*, Orem, UT., Dy Wayne Tanner, President. 
This Is a formal request that you attend that closing so as to sign the deed 
to the trust property and relevant closing papers* Thank you* 
Sincerely, 
Jim Sauers, Successor Trustee 




J . QIADE DUH5TELIER 
pirn* ol P.O. Sox 436, Provo »coa«r»f 
CONVEY trtWASUrt to JAME5 H. SAUERS 
Utah . 5<*<l of Utlft. bfllbf 
EHT 4 6 7 4 5 BK 3 4 6 0 PG 1 7 7 
NINA B REID UTAH CO RECORDER BY HB 
199* JUN 3 415* PR FEE 13.00 
RECORDED FOR JADES U 6AUERS 
gnnififi tf P-0- Bo* *36% Prove, Utah, Utah County* 54603-4)436 
lorih« tomof Ten dollar^ (SlO.UU) and other tjood and valuable consideration, received In hand, 
too following (kieiifccd rnclS oriindln Utah (Orem C i t y ) Caimiy. Sine ef W*ft; 
See Schedule "A" attached and Incorporated herein by reference, (over) 
WITHM$, ib« Mnd of uld JlftMor
 # ffctt ^ t h oif of ^ . A. p, I * 94 
0. GLADE DUR5TELUER 
Signed til itic praeoce of 
sr Ate'or K M * NEVADA 
cmniiiur WASHOE f " 15 
Oalbt 4th Ujol May 
A, Di U 94 poiamllj ippcirod tefcM n« 
J . 6LADE DURSTELLER 
tfcv ilftM* ol «fa» 
whopifltdftd Iv DPI 
booty 
oflteoWidM 
Cefmnlaionesffmi' (Jj j j j i I \\Q(rf itf Pfefcllfi 
WCODPINQ DATA 
t w f No. r « i 
aaooaoED Q INDEXED O D 
FLATTED O ABTIACTfpD 
COMPAteD • DfLlVEtED D 
rmM 
ENT4674-5 BK 3 4 6 0 PG 1 7 S 
SCHEDULE "A* 
Situated in Utah CduSlV7^5Eifr"5f UWfi: 
Bey Inning at i pofnt on tha cormr on tha East edga of cartei-vllla 
ftaad and on tho South vdos of Ifepa Lena, which point Is North 084.09 
feat and East 1,403,79 fait, m r i or lees, rron the Wtot quarter 
corner of Sacelon 26, Township fl South, Rene* I Ewt t Salt Loka aaao 
and ffeH<Jlan; thanca South 04 dog. 10 1/2 ' East I0D feat along a 
hedge and fanct on tha South a Ida of Hope lane; thanco Sai/th 3 da*. 
05' Moat 70 foot; thance North 64 dag, 10 \n ' Mast loo feat to tha 
Cast tdgs of Cartanrllle Road; thanca North J dag. 06' East 70 foat 
along tha east atda of OartervtUe Road to the point of beginning, 
and 
12, LOT 19, PLAT "A", UNNWO0U PARK SUBDIVISION, OflEM. UTAH ACCORDING Tn IMP 
OFFICE PtAT THEREOF ON F . U IN HIE O F F l t t V THE ^ ^ 7 ^ ! ! UTAN 
®016 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
g'x/rt&'/r "& 
^tAttar s of 
QUIT CXAIH 
fMAle? 
PATRICIA 5YKES end WANE J . SYKES 
1511 So. Certervllle Rd. 
Ores, Uuh B4053 
Oram &wf of Utah 
HAX S. FERRE 
P.O. Box 463 
Provo* Uteh 84603-0463 
. Suet of Ufth. htrcbv 
CMT 5 1 0 2 B R 3 0 7 ? Pfi 1 1 
HIM » REID UTAH CO flCCOfcDEH BY W 
1993 JAN 28 4! 10 Ml FIE I2»Q0 
tfeoftOED F a i w s FE*RE 
for I M * • * a ten doll i n end other oood ind velutble considered on. In band Di ld. 
ilit faoWiof dwifcri tad t oi I M 4 Ift UUh CwMr. Suit o iUuV 
See nine (9) trects described In Schedule aA* en the reverie side hereof. 
WITNESS, lW tod o| Hid 
S ^ f t i f c l W , 
$>«"• ISth M . July 
PATIRCIA SYKES ^ 
A. a I f 87 
STATE OP UTAH 
Coutroi UTAH 
Oo iW 15th 
A. D, 19 87 
K 
dty of July 
•ppoMvd below i 
Pitr icie Sorkes end Owne JL Sjrkes 
RECORDING DATA 
l£|017 
Schedule "A" QCD, Sykct to F e r e , July 15, 1987 
ea* 99 FT 5i i »G I T i M $w co3 LOT 10 <H:SHT sy*; • * : FT; J j n ; u *a FT* N 
o * ! • > 
CUT 4.5 FT Of U9T I0„ P U T D , CUOU 




¥ 2 • : • • 
a . - « — 
OE0B 4CAE3 




I I FT S 
IS / 5 1 * , 
~ 5U3D. 
M 1 31 
« 1 : 
5 I Ci 
9¥?•*-- 77 ^ ' 
! 10^W « Z J 7 FJ; 5 3? 3C0 0 * * 4 1 * 8 10 *T 
Sjt fJ jaA* 
3<s> M I J-I rt c FF «# co« « * aiFF FIJIHEI» K L I H I O «MUP. SEC «. » w i M » " , 
, , , , l U , i 1 i l . 9 12* FTl H t4 FT( It I * M « • * ' f i « » » « •• ' « • « • 
lufA iS * t IEIHQ "** * V « * * W U « ' US? IMC * I * ' F l . 
*LV> MW4I M I C<!» J.'l « ! W ? i C « « « CUFF FCHIIEr WEU«K> 0 « W | E 170 
(9 
<£ 
nr»"i53"«7« "i*2.3B"ni it ia DEB I I - E iM.ot FT ro CM. ^ . , * . I £ £ ! £ & ' 
x ,





» l i U i v U i g t t t r l b t i r * l l t t t i C i Id Utah C . . « t r , 
^ le i t i
 v i ut i i - HSSW I M . I 6 q-OW-ocrS^ C ^ ? \ 2 t ^ i ^ • 
I?.!1 "-S^1 S 9 * D E 0 l 7 ' 2 2" E 2> FT| B 223 FT II OR I TO 0E0. AKM " 2 Of AN 
^
i E ; « B C T T C R » « » • » A8I COI II 1402,82 FT 4 M 1207.372 FT FOB | ^ CM fi£C 
E 23.260 FT| 9 234.114 FT TO AEO. IE98 N 24 FT 
ALSO W4CWI ASi COIH P402-02 FT * U 1207,372 FT FH 9 \/A rno SEC 13 i » aip 
Mine's «;02'w "•*" "• M ,,e'12 " • s" •» ^ * "»?»VJ • 
„ M^B-ir» r T H U " • » " " • - ' • —^- * «^ • - . • * 
COM BBS 04 FT E OF MV COA tOT 4, BIK B. PI OOOVI CITY BUA5- B BB1 Ff; W 7.44 FT; 
M IB FT'M OA is N 1 010 03'40-E IBS.03 FT TD OCO. 
COM SV COn iOT 3i PLAT C. CLAHHOHT PiAZA BUI; A 138.10 Ft; BEIT 13B.I0 FT TO B L 
OT LINI ; B BB OCO 4B-« X ¥ • FT TO OCO. * 
l7* 
COM B ABI.04 FI A W Bit.6$ FT FH NF. CDA AEC 9, IBA, 071 .„. ^ „ „„ ^ 
4,07 FT; AIDNO A.B2 FT AAO CUA TO A 1 1 3 (CUD 0 fi? DID 0B'B4:V B.BB Fir 
23-3B-W H2.M tt TD Btd AHEA .01 AC. ( s ^ ) ^ " * 
ILH; B 4 OCO 04*Z7*E 10 i N l 0|fl 
gois 
f 
IIUI1I I'I MLI - . 5 . ' - -m 17599 
WARRANTY DEED 
£x#/0n- V 
DHAKE J . SYKES' 4 PATRICIA StKES 
tor?,..,
 rf ISU So- Carter? I l l a Rd. Orem, Utah Gruel 
hot*by CONVEX. AND WARRANT-, Wi~ 
HA* S. FERRE 
4338 W 2650 N, Plain City, Utah 84404 Gnat**..., oL_ 
for th« iion of- 110.00 and other good ^nd valuable consideration 
Utah 
..JJOLLABS 
-County, th« following d©icrlfc*d tr«ct of Und fiL>«».„ 
Sut« of UUK, to-vffc 
That portion of the South one-half of the South one-half of the Northwest 
quarter of Section 26, Township Eight South* Range One East. Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, ly.lng West of that North-South feneellne situated along the toe of the 
east embankment of the Strawberry H1ghl1ne Canal Road, and including said canal 
and canal road and property West thereof, being 23 acres, more or less. 
Including therewith a right-of-way easen&nt for ingress and egress over and upor. 
Che Strawberry Hlghline Canal Road throi,.,nout Sections 23, 26, and 35 T. 8 S., 
R 1 E* and throughout Sections 2, 11, 14, and 23 T 9 S» ft 1 E, SLB&M, and 
the connecting roads thereto-
Subject to all easements, rights* reseveratlons and restrictions of record. 
WITNESS TrtE HAND.-S. of laid Grantor..?, thb 
..EeiHtuarx. 
Sifned La Iho prftia&et of 
... A. D> 19...BA 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Counly at Utah.. 
Oh the §th
 d|fcy oi f,^rU9hy m % hf D . l$.J±n pAr-onnliy .ppasrod 
before mo, a Notary Public ID and for the Stale of Utah, ...«.««-...».»•«.»-»-» 
...DuAne.. J.„.Syi£s^anil.-P.a_tr.ici fl._5y.Le: S_ 
Cho tlfliars., of th« abov* irulru/nunt, who duly «cknowlodffcd to .jac that -LJhe.X exec tu&e. j 
J?i m 
My commlnlon expire* 
4 y « 
•) ;,t.,j, r.i. --r««r». m.t. 
' less * 
3- 7jSt:«-""SF 
ADDENDUM 5 
RALPH C. AMOTT (#68) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801) 377-6575 
IN" THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UT 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F, HATCH, 
Plaintiff/ 









CIVIL No. 950400719 CV 
DWANE J. SYKES, DENNIS L. * 
SYKES, BENOY & ANGELA 
TAMANG, Trustees of the so- * 
called "Irrevocable Trust 
Agreement", aka "THE DWAYNE * 
SYKES AND PATRICIA SYKES * 
CH1LDRENS' TRUST AND/OR THE * 
DWAYNE AND PATRICIA SYKES TRUST,* 
JOHNNY M. IVERSON, MAX FERRE, * 
J. Glade Dursteller, James * 





COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through his attorney Ralph C-
Amott, and allege against Defendants by way of Amended Complaint as 
granted by the Court as follows: 
JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. That Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State of 
Utah, and the acts complained of herein and the alleged 
fraudulently conveyed real property described herein are located in 
1 
Utah County, State of Utah-
2. That this action is brought for violation of the 
provisions of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act, UCA 25-6-1 et seq., by 
Defendant Dwane J. Sykes to avoid his lawful creditors and their 
lawful claims, and with the complicity of the named defendants-
3. That Defendants Dwane J, Sykes, Benoy and Angela Tamang, 
and Johnny M. Iverson are residents of Utah County• 
4. That Defendant Dennis Sykes is a resident of the State of 
Alaska. 
5. That Defendant Max Ferre is a resident of Davis County, 
State of Utah. 
6- That Defendants Patricia Sykes, J. Glade Dursteller, and 
James Sauer and William Christiansen are believed to be residents 
of Utah County, State of Utah. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS 
7. That Plaintiff has had legal dispute with Defendant Dwane 
J. Sykes since shortly after he first entered into an option 
agreement with Defendant Dwane Sykes in June of 1974 to sell 
Plaintiff's home and property located at 1511 South Carterville 
Road, in Orem, Utah. 
8. That after Defendant Dwane Sykes received title to said 
property in 1975 there arose serious legal disputes between 
Plaintiff and Defendant Dwane Sykes wherein Plaintiff felt Sykes 
was making wrongful claims on property he did not own and 
wrongfully encumbering property not in his name and other wrongful 
acts. That these disputes led directly to the filing of lawsuits 
2 
in the Fourth District Court of Utah County, (#57,127 and #63,695, 
later consolidated in 1982), between these parties, Civ.#810457127, 
in which Plaintiff made claim against Defendant Dwane Sykes, his 
wife Patricia, and his brother Dennis for a large sum. 
9. That in the midst of these disputes and with full 
knowledge of potential liabilities Defendant Dwane Sykes quit-
claimed his interest in the Carterville property to his brother 
Dennis Sykes, and on information and belief Plaintiff alleges that 
said transfer was done for the purpose of avoiding and defrauding 
potential creditors, and without sufficient consideration* (See Ex. 
A-l, for copy of said deed). 
10- That in 1975 Defendant Dwane Sykes obtained other 
property in his name in Utah County from Mr. and Mrs- Anthony 
Raggozine. (See Ex. A2 deed attached) * That on information and 
belief this property was also transferred to Defendant Dwane Sykes1 
brother Dennis at the same time period as the Carterville property 
described above and when the legal disputes with Plaintiff were 
heating up, and done for the purpose of avoiding and defrauding 
potential creditors and without sufficient consideration. 
11 . That Plaintiff, on information and belief, alleges that 
Defendant Dwane Sykes, during the intervening years, has had 
recorded bogus encumbrances against the subject real properties for 
the purpose of creating the illusion that these were encumbered, 
and in an attempt to avoid potential creditors, and to discourage 
execution against these properties- That these properties, and 
others over which Defendant Dwane Sykes has control have been 
3 
transferred to various people and alleged "Trusts11 and assorted 
trustees including Defendants Iverson and Ferre1 and others such as 
J. Glade Dursteller and James Sauers, and of which Defendants' 
Tamang are the latest and most recent alleged "Trustees", all with 
the same intent to avoid and defraud creditors • That on 
information and belief said Trust or Trusts are shams with the 
primary purpose being the avoidance of creditors. 
12- That these bogus and fraudulent encumbrances/documents 
include, but are not limited to, an apparent sworn affidavit dated 
31 December, 1987 in which Defendant Dennis Sykes, asserted a 
"contract interest" in certain real property on behalf of Defendant 
Dwane Sykes, which real property is more fully described in Exhibit 
"C", attached hereto and made a part of this action thereby, to 
wit: a 3^1/4 acre parcel of land located on Carterville Road in 
Orem, Utah, (referred to as the north 1/2) and ostensibly held in 
the name of one William Christiansen, but which would appear, in 
fact, to be property belonging to and used by Defendant Dwane 
Sykes, and which on information and belief of Plaintiff, was bought 
for Defendant Dwane Sykes by Christiansen with Sykes money-
Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that said document 
titled "Application for Assessment and Taxation of Agricultural 
Land" is a forgery, was illegally notarized by one having a direct 
interest therein, Patricia Sykes, and also an attempt to improperly 
cloud title to this property and thereby avoid and defraud 
creditors, 
13. That this "Application for Assessment and Taxation of 
4 
Agricultural Land", referred to in paragraph 12 previously, reveals 
the pattern of fraudulent behavior of Defendant Dwane Sykes. He 
claims an interest in the property sufficient to ask for a 
governmental break in taxation on one hand; then on the other hand 
he claims the property is out of his name and not available for 
creditors to attach-
14. That other alleged fraudulent conveyances include the 
following and besides those set forth above: 
a. That on or about June 3, 1994, Defendant Dwane Sykes 
produced for recording a Warranty Deed (See Ex. MDM attached and 
incorporated by reference herein) allegedly executed by Johnny M. 
Iverson describing two parcels of real prperty subject of this 
action, to wit: Lot 29, Plat "A" in Lynnwood Park Subd., Orem, 
Utah, and a parcel of land and house located at about 1475 South 
Carterville Road, Orem, Utah County, Utah, as described in exhibit 
"D\ Heretofore, it is alleged by Plaintiff on information and 
belief, Defendant Iverson had refused to convey title to the 
Lynnwood Park property until certain obligations due him were 
addressed. It is alleged on information and belief that this 
conveyance is a fraudulent document with a superimposed (or pasted 
in) legal description and not actually signed by Defendant Iverson 
for the purpose intended. It appears the document is even 
notarized by Defendnat Dwane Sykes which would be improper as well. 
This document therefore is another in a chain of fraudulent 
conveyances hiding property from creditors and that Defendant 
Iverson, and then subsequent transferees, were simply holding these 
5 
properties for the benefit of Defendant Dwane Sykes- That they 
were transferred without adequate consideration to insiders with 
intent to defraud creditors. 
That the chain of fraudulent conveyances continued 
through Iverson to Durstellar to Sauers, (See Ex. "F" attached 
hereto and incorporated by reference herein). 
b. That on or about July 15, 1987 Defendant Dwane Sykes 
conveyed by Quit-claim deed nine separate tracts of land located in 
Utah County to Defendant Max S. Ferre without adequate 
consideration and for the primary purpose of defrauding creditors. 
(See Ex. "G" attached hereto and incorporated by reference 
herein.)That on information and belief Defendant Ferre was holding 
these properties for and on behalf and for the benefit of Defendant 
Dwane Sykes peronally. 
c. That on or about the 5th of February, 1984, Defendant 
Dwane Sykes conveyed by Warranty Deed to Defendant Max S- Ferre 
title to a parcel of land in Utah County containing approximately 
23 acres, belonging to Defendant Dwane Sykes, without adequate 
consideration and for the sole or primary purpose of avoiding an 
defrauding creditors. (See Ex. "H" attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference herein). That defendant Ferre, and all 
other defendant transferees herein were relatives or insiders as to 
the financial condition of Defendant Dwane Sykes and were aware 
that creditors had lawful claims against Defendant Dwane Sykes that 
he could not or would not pay, or potential liability for the same. 
d. That an or about the 13th day of February, 1995, just a 
few days after a large jury-awarded verdict was granted against 
Defendant Dwane Sykes, Dennis Sykes, and others, as set forth in 
paragraph 13 following, a quit-claim deed was executed by Dennis 
Sykes in favor of Defendant's Tamang as alleged Trustees on an 
unspecified trust, conveying title to four separate pieces of real 
property in Utah County. On information and belief, Plaintiff 
alleges that these properties were previously held in Dennis Sykes' 
name for the benefit of Defendant Dwane Sykes, and that the so-
called trust(s) to whom conveyance was made are a sham and were set 
up for the benefit of Defendant Dwane Sykes, have been controlled 
by him and are intended for the primary purpose of avoiding and 
defrauding creditors and were without adequate consideration, and 
therefore should be set aside. (See Ex. "A3" attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference herein,) 
e. On information and belief there were other fraudulent 
conveyances, some yet to be identified, intended to bury and hide 
assets of Defendant Dwane Sykes and these include, but are not 
limited to, transfers to certain individuals named Pack, believed 
to be insider relatives, and transfers to an entity called Frontier 
International Land Corporation believed to be a front for Defendant 
Dwane Sykes. 
15. That Plaintiff obtained a large money judgment in the 
suit above referenced, #810457127, against Defendant Dwane Sykes 
and others on February 6, 1995, in the amount of 509,942.03.(Said 
judgment was later reduced to $141,693.52, by the Court after 
motion for reconsideration). Original judgment attached as Ex. "B" 
7 
and amended judgment as Ex. "Bln, and incorporated by reference 
herein. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
16. Plaintiff realleges all prior allegations as if the same 
had been fully set forth herein. 
17. That the transfers set forth herein are fraudulent and 
should be set aside for the benefit of Plaintiff creditor in that 
Defendant Dwane Sykes, and those acting for him and with him, made 
said transfers with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 
Plaintiff and other credidtors, and/or without receiving a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 
obligation. 
18. That at the time of these transfers Defendant Dwane Sykes 
and those acting for him and with him, intended to, or knew he and 
they were reasonably likely to, incur, or reasonably should have 
known or believed, debts beyond Defendant Dwane Sykes ability to 
pay when due. 
19. That there are sufficient badges of fraudulent conveyance 
in these transactions to justify this court holding that the 
conveyances were fraudulent and should be declared void and set 
aside and made subject to the lawful execution of Plaintiff 
creditor* These badges of fraudulent conveyances include: 
a. The conveyances alleged were made to relatives or 
other insiders. 
b. Defendant Dwane Sykes retained possession or control 
8 
of the property transferred after the transfer. 
c„ That efforts were made to conceal the transfers 
through use of "levels'1 of transferees. 
d. That before the transfers had been made the 
debtor/Defendant Dwane Sykes had been sued or threatened with suit, 
or reasonably could expect a suit would be forthcoming. 
e. The overall transfers and property conveyed amount to 
substantially all of the Defendant Dwane Sykes assets. 
f. That Defendant Dwane Sykes was insolvent or became 
insolvent shortly after the transfers were made. 
20. That Plaintiff, by virtue of all the foregoing is 
entitled to an avoidance of the transfers as described or referred 
to herein or in any way relating to the properties set forth 
herein, to the extent necessary to satisfy Plaintiff's claim of 
judgment agaisnt Defendant Dwane Sykes as set forth herein. 
Also, to an attachment or other provisional remedy against the 
asset transferred or other property of the respective transferee 
thereto in accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure, 
including the right to levy and execute on the same. 
Also, for the issuance of an injunction against further 
disposition by the debotr/Defendant Dwane Sykes or a transferee, or 
both, of the asset transferred or of other property. 
And also, for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of 
the assset or assetts transferred or of other property of the 
respective transferee involved. 
9 
21. That the former wife of Defendant Dwane Sykes was 
involved in some of the transactions described above, but on 
information and belief Plaintiff alleges that through her divorce 
settlement of January, 1996, she has given up claim of interest in 
any of the properties described herein, or in the alternative that 
her interst therein if any should be subordinated to the claim of 
Plaintiff herein. 
22 • That Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs and fees 
incurred herein as may be found reasonable and appropriate by the 
Court* 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. For an Order of avoidance of the transfers as described or 
referred to herein or in any way relating to the properties set 
forth herein, to the extent necessary to satisfy Plaintiff's claim 
of judgment agaisnt Defendant Dwane Sykes as set forth herein, 
which judgment balance is at least $135,000.00 plus accrued 
interest, (the original judgment was much larger but reduced later 
by the court, which reduction is presently on appeal and may 
ultimately therefore, be much larger.) 
2. For an Order of attachment or other provisional remedy 
against the asset transferred or other property of the respective 
transferee thereto in accordance with applicable rules of civil 
procedure, including the right to levy and execute on the same. 
3. For an Order of injunction against further disposition by 
10 
the debotr/Defendant Dwane Sykes or a transferee, or both, of the 
asset transferred or of other property-
4. For an Order of appointment of a receiver to take charge 
of the assset or assetts transferred or of other property of the 
respective transferee involved. 
5. For an Order declaring Patricia Sykes to have no interest 
in the claimed fraudulently conveyed properties superior to the 
claim of Plaintiff herein-
6. For judgment against Defendant Dwane Sykes for costs 
incurred herein and reasonable attorney fees where applicable and 
also against any other defendants wrongfully found to be contesting 
the claims of Plaintiff herein. As to Defendants Dennis Sykes and 
Patricia Sykes, this Plaintiff seeks no monetary damages or 
judgment due to settlement reached with these parties after entry 
of judgment in the case # 810457127 as set forth above. Said 
defendants have been named for declaratory purposes only to 
ascertain rights as to the alleged fraudulently conveyed properties 
and to establish where necessary the chain of wrongful conveyances. 
7. For such other and further relief as the court may find 
just and appropriate in the premises. 
DATED this o? /'day of August, 1996. 
Ralph C. Amott, Atty. for 
Plaintiff Hatch 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
11 
Amended Complaint by Plaintiff was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
^?1 day of August, 1996, to the following: 
Clark R. Nielsen 
HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
1160 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004 
Attorney for Dennis L. Sykes 
Gordon Duval 
Duval, Hansen Witt & Morley, L.L.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Attorney for Johnny Iverson 
Dwane Sykes 
1511 So. Carterville Rd. 
Orem, UT 84057 
Max Ferre 
1973 East 2400 North 
Layton, Utah 84004 
R. Kent Ludlow 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
P.O, Box 11808 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 




Attorney for William Christiansen 
746 E. 3800 N. 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 226-0993 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD E HATCH 
Plaintiff 
v. 




MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS 
AGAINST WILLIAM CHRISTIANSEN 
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Civil No. 950 400 719 CV 
Honorable Don J. Eyre 
Date: 21 November 1996 
Defendant William Chiistiansen through his attorney Sam Primavera files this motion 
to dismiss claims against William Christiansen. Pursuant to U.R.CP. 12(b)(6) William 
Christiansen asks the court to dismiss all claims against him inasmuch as such claims are 
barred by the doctrine of Res judicata. 
FACTS 
1) Over 15 years ago multiple claims (cases 57,125 63,695 & 57,127) were initiated in which 
inter aha a claim was brought against William Christiansen by Howard Hatch alleging that Mr. 
Chiistiansen had purchased property at trustee's sale in collusion with Zions bank and other 
defendants including Dwane Sykes. 
cA!rV .wtf 
2) Howard Hatch alleged in that complaint that Mr. Christiansen was the "strawman purchaser" 
of property which Mr, Christiansen was actually purchasing for and in behalf of Mr. Dwane 
Sykes. 
3) The case dragged on for years. 
4) On April 17 1991 Judge Mower signed an order disposing of the case as it pertains to Mr. 
Christiansen. 
5) Judge Mower's April 17 1991 order states "Defendant Christiansen has asked the Court to 
dismiss any claims against him and to award him some attorney's fees. The court intends to 
grant the requests. First I will analyze the situation in light of the motion to dismiss. 
ANALYSIS IN RE MOTION TO DISMISS One of the claims in case number 63,695 was for 
damages against Zions Bank arising out of a trustee's sale conducted many years ago. Mr. 
Christiansen was the successful bidder at that sale. Plaintiffs claim was that the sale, where 
their property had been sold, had been improperly announced or scheduled and improperly 
conducted. "Improperly" may be too weak a word to describe plaintiffs claims - they said that 
the bank and Mr. Christiansen and other defendants conspired together to schedule and to 
conduct an illegal sale" 
6) The sale described in Judge Mowers order is exactly the same sale as the transaction 
referred to in paragraph 12 of Mr. Hatch's amended complaint in this case. 
7) The April 17 1991 dismissal by Judge Mower was upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
8) Shortly before 5 July 1995 Mr. Hatch again initiated an action against Mr, Christiansen in 
which Mr. Hatch attempted to sell Mr. Christiansen's property at sheriffs sale claiming it was 
Mr. Sykes' property. 
9) Judge Mower again heard the case and ruled on 7 August 1995 that the sale of Mr. 
Christiansen property was not supported by the requisite order of the court. 
10) Judge Mower also ruled that "Any reopening of the question of whether Mr. William 
Christiansen was the "strawman" of Mr. Sykes under the facts of this case [identical to the 
instant facts] is barred by the doctrine of "res judicata", inasmuch as this issue was dealt with 
in a prior order which was subsequently upheld on appeal." 
11) Judge Mower in the same order granted an award of attorney's fees due to the "frivolous" 
and improper procedures followed by Mr, Hatch. 
12) Both of the awards of attorney's fees had to be collected by attachment from Mr. Hatch. 
Neither was paid voluntarily. 
13) Now Mr. Hatch has filed another claim using the identical facts of the previous two cases. 
14) The events complained of occurred more than 10 years ago. 
ARGUMENT 
Under ILR.C.P. Rule 13(a) 
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving 
the pleading the pleader has against an opposing party, if it arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim" 
All claims that Mr. Hatch had were decided in the prior adjudication or are precluded 
under these rules or under the common law doctrine of res judicata- The prior case was the 
exact same facts as the facts of the instant complaint. The complaint is also the same. Mr. 
Hatch is claiming that Mr. Sykes is a "strawman purchaser". He is claiming that the property 
was actually purchased by Mr. Christiansen for and in behalf of Mr. Christiansen This is 
exactly the same claim and exactly the same set as facts as have been dealt with twice before 
by Judge Mower. At some point this dispute needs to be put to rest Mr. Hatch is simply 
harassing Mr. Christiansen and trying to reverse a decision that he has already lost 
Under U.CU Sec, 78-12-6 No action founded upon title to real estate shall be valid if 
the owner of the real estate has held the property for 7 or more years. The events in this action 
are over 15 years old. There is no longer any valid action that may be commenced based upon 
those actions. 
CONCLUSION 
The old saw that the third time is the charm does not apply in matters of repetitive 
litigation. The issue presented to the court has already been adjudicated twice. In both cases 
attorney's fees were awarded for tbe misdeeds of Mr. Hatch, Not only does this waste Mr. 
Christiansen's time, energy and money, it is wasting die time of the court and perverting the 
judicial process. Law suits may be fun and a sort of hobby for Mr. Hatch. But, they are not fun 
for Mr, Christiansen. Mr. Christiansen asks for an order dismissing all claims against him as 
res judicata and precluded by the statute of limitations and for an award of attorney's fees to 
he established by affidavit. 
SamPrimavera 
ADDENDUM 7 
RALPH C- AMOTT (#68) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801) 377-6575 
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DWANE J. SYKES, DENNIS L. * 
SYKES, BENOY & ANGELA 
TAMANG, Trustees of the so- * 
called "Irrevocable Trust 
Agreement", aka "THE DWAYNE * 
SYKES AND PATRICIA SYKES * 
CHILDRENS1 TRUST AND/OR THE * 
DWAYNE AND PATRICIA SYKES TRUST,* 
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REPLY TO CHRISTIANSEN 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
COUNTERCLAIM; AND 
PLAINITFF'S MOTION FOR 
DISMISSAL AND/OR REMOVAL 
CHRISTIANSEN AS A NAMED 
PARTY DEFENDANT 
CIVIL No. 950400719CV 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through his attorney Ralph C. 
Amott, and responds and replies to the motion to dismiss and 
counterclaim filed by William Christiansen herein. Plaintiff 
objects to the claims made by Christiansen and to the request for 
damages which is unfounded and inequitable. Christiansen's 
request is premature in that he has not been served in this matter 
1 
in any fashion. Plaintiff specifically responds as follows; 
1. It is true that Plaintiff and Defendant Dwane Sykes have 
been engaged in ongoing litigation for many years, both usually 
acting Pro Se. Plaintiff finally obtained a large judgment against 
Defendant Dwane Sykes in February of 1995. The present case was 
instituted by Plaintiff, again pro se, alleging valid claims of 
fraudulent conveyance by Mr. Sykes that have made it nearly 
impossible for creditors to rightfully pursue lawful collection 
remedies against Mr. Sykes. 
2. The original complaint filed by Plaintiff listed several 
parties as co-defendants who were thought to be involved in the 
chain of title of some of these allegedly fraudulently conveyed 
properties. Mr. Christansen herein was not one of the originally 
listed defendants. Mr- Hatch also filed a request for the right to 
amend his complaint shortly after he filed it in 1995. 
At this point Mr. Hatch was unexpectedly called on a mission 
for the LDS Church with his wife to Germany. They left in April of 
1996 and shortly before his leaving he contacted my office for 
representation help and left a number of documents with me. In 
August of this year, one of the Defendants filed a motion with the 
court asking that Plaintiff amend his complaint per his pro se 
motion of many months earlier- As counsel for Plaintiffr Mr. 
Amott had not requested that an amended complaint be filed at that 
time and in fact objected to the request that Plaintiff be forced 
to amend his complaint right at that time inasmuch as Mr. Amott was 
still attempting to sift through the voluminous documents in this 
2 
matter and determine the relevant issues. An effort complicated by 
Plaintiff Hatch's being in Germany- Mr. Amott's request for 
additional time before an amended complaint was filed was denied by 
the court and he was instructed to file an amended complaint within 
20 days-
3, Pursuant to this request, an amended complaint was 
prepared. Communication with Plaintiff Hatch has and continues to 
be difficult because of his being in Germany. In preparing the 
amended complaint/ counsel Amott for Plaintiff reviewed all 
documents presently in his possession to determine how best to 
flesh out the applicable issues. Three potential defendants were 
identified from that review of documents and added as defendants, 
namely Dursteller/ Sauer and Christiansen* In order to meet the 
court's deadline for the amended complaint and still preserve my 
client's rights as to other possible defendants these names were 
added to the amended complaint as parties having dealings with 
property of Mr. Sykes that were at issue here. At the time of 
preparing the amended complaint. Counsel Amott had not seen or been 
informed by anyone of the prior rulings in other cases regarding 
Mr* Christiansen and Mr. Hatch and was unaware of them till copies 
were received with Christiansen's Motion to Dismiss. 
4. Of key importance here is the fact that though a few more 
defendants were named to preserve the right to have them involved 
if necessary at a later date, none of the three additional parties, 
including Mr» Christiansen herein, was served with the amended 
complaint nor was any attempt made to serve hinu Counsel Amott 
3 
wished to further investigate the complexities of this case so that 
matters such as have been raised by Mr. Christiansen as to prior 
orders or rulings could be fully examined. It is unfortunate in 
the extreme in that regard that Counsel for Mr. Christiansen did 
not see fit to privately inform counsel for Plaintiff of these 
earlier rulings. A simple call or letter would have resolved the 
matter completely- Instead he chose to file motions and 
counterclaims without Mr. Christiansen even being served in an 
attempt to paint an unduly harsh and unfair picture and apparently 
in the hopes of reaping some huge damage windfall- At the very 
least it appears as an attempt to chill Plaintiff's rights or 
ability to proceed in the case in chief which is suspect inasmuch 
as on information and belief it is believed by Plaintiff that 
Counsel Primavera for Mr, Christiansen has in the past represented 
Mr. Dwane Sykes who is the primary target of this lawsuit, and that 
he is very familiar with Mr. Sykes and his situation* 
5- Based on the documents supplied by Mr. Christiansen with 
his motion, Plaintiff has no problem with the idea that 
Christiansen should not be served in this matter and that if 
necessary his name may be removed from the heading of the amended 
complaint. If he is needed as a witness, the prior rulings 
supplied by Christiansen would not seem to prevent that 
possibility- Inasmuch as Christiansen was and is not served, a 
motion to dismiss and counterclaim and answer seem premature and 
unnecessary and not the proper avenue to follow if what is wanted 
is to have his name removed from the heading of the case. Again, 
4 
Plaintiff will stipulate to that removal-
6* As to Christainsen's counterclaim, its effect is 
questionable inasmuch as he is unserved, but to protect Plaintiff's 
interests herein, Plaintiff hereby denies all allegations of 
Christiansen's counterclaim, including but not limited to the 
specific allegations of abuse of process, harrassment, invasion of 
privacy and Rule 11 violations-
7. The law is clear that until a party is served with process 
this court has no jurisdiction over Mr. Christiansen. Therefore no 
relief even remotely adverse to Mr. Christiansen could be sought by 
Plaintiff, or any plaintiff, till he was served- Therefore all the 
claims of Christiansen of abuse of process, harassment, malicious 
prsecutions, etc, would seem to be manufactured claims based on 
what has gone on so far. 
8- Plaintiff herein, in his own right, moves this court for 
an order removing the name of William Christiansen from the heading 
of the case, and if necessary because of the voluntary answer filed 
by Christiansen, that the matter be dismissed as to hinu 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests that the claims set 
forth in Christiansen's counterclaim be denied as unfounded and 
premature and grant Plaintiff's stipulated agreement herein to 
remove Mr. Christiansen as a party defendant (unserved) based on 
the documents from an earlier case provided with their pleadings. 
Plaintiff also requests that no damages or fees be awarded in this 
matter inasmuch as any error committed was inadvertant and without 
actual knowledge of the particulars set forth by Christiansen in 
5 
his pleadings and have been blown out of proportion when a much 
less costly route could have been pursued to resolve this 
misunderstanding-
DATED this j V day of November, 1996. 
Ralph C, Amott, Atty- for 
Plaintiff Hatch 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Plaintiff's Verified Response and Reply to Christiansen1 s Motion to 
dismiss and Counterclaim, and Motion for removal and/or Dismissal 
of William Christiansen as a Named Party Defendant, was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this D jTday of November, 1996, to the following: 




Sam Primavera (5413) 
Attorney for William Christiansen 
746E. 3800 N. 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 226-0993 
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ORDER FOR DISMISSAL OF 
CLAIMS AGAINST WILLIAM 
CHRISTIANSEN 
Civil No. 950 400 719 CV 
Honorable Don J. Eyre 
The Court having reviewed the applicable documents and considered all arguments 
presented, makes the following judgement and order: 
1) The claims made by Mr. Hatch in the instant case against William Christiansen are 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata and by the applicable statute of Limitation. 
2) The actions by Mr. Hatch in prosecuting this claim, yet a third time, were frivolous 
and constitute harassment of William Christiansen. 
3) Any and all claims against William Christiansen in this case and related to the instant 
set of facts are dismissed with prejudice and Mr. Hatch is ordered not to again bring 
such a case against Mr. Christiansen under penalty of a finding of contempt 
4) Attorney's fees and all costs incurred are awarded to Mr. Christiansen in an amount 
to be established by affidavit of Mr, Primavera. 
5) The Court reserves the right to award Rule 11 sanctions until judgement is rendered 
on Mr. Christiansen's counter-claim. 
6 
ADDENDUM 9 
Sam Primavera (5413) 
Attorney for William Christiansen 
746 E. 3800 N. 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone.' (801) 861-4551 JUDGMENT 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F. HATCH 
Plaintiff 
v. 




JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 950 400 719 CV 
f)\)J\n\Yi(\k^ 
Judge Eyre has previous ruled in a motion for summary judgment in this case that 
Howard Hatch had committed an abuse of civil process but had reserved the award of damages 
for trial The case came on for trial before a jury on the 20th and 21st of October 1999. The 
jury found that Mr, Christiansen had been damaged by Mr. Hatch and awarded Mr. 
Christiansen $1,000 in compensatory damages. Therefore: 
1) It is ordered that Mr. Hatch pay to Mr. Christiansen $1,000 (one thousand dollars) in 
compensatory damages, 
2) Statutory interest will accrue beginning on the date that this judgment and order is 
1 
signed. 
3) This award shall be augmented by any and all costs of collection, including but not 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the judgment and order was sent first class postage 
prepaid on ? 0 day of /(^« 19 ^ Q to: 
Ralph C. Amott 
60 E. 100 S. Ste 102 
Provo, UT 84606 
Fourth District Court 
125 N. 100 W. 
Provo, UT 84601 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the fQ day of January, 2005 I caused to be delivered via the following 
method two copies of the foregoing to the following: 
Spencer F. Hatch 
1433LakeviewDr.,#100 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
/} U.S. Mail 
D Facsimile 
D Hand-Delivered 
• Federal Express 
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